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Risky inter-temporal choices involve choosing between options that can differ in outcomes, 
their probability of receipt, and the delay until receipt. To date, there has been no attempt to 
systematically test, compare and evaluate theoretical models of such choices. We contribute to 
theory development by generating predictions from seven models for three common 
manipulations- magnitude, certainty and immediacy- across six different types of risky inter-
temporal choices. Qualitative and quantitative comparisons of model predictions to data from 
an experiment involving almost 4000 individual choices revealed that an attribute comparison-
model, newly modified to incorporate risky inter-temporal choices, (the Risky Inter-Temporal 
Choice Heuristic or RITCH) provided the best account of the data. Results are consistent with 
growing evidence in support of attribute comparison models in the risky and inter-temporal 
choice literatures, and suggest that the relatively poorer fits of translation-based models reflect 
their inability to predict the differential impact of certainty and immediacy manipulations. 
Future theories of risky inter-temporal choice may benefit from treating risk and time as 
independent dimensions, and focusing on attribute-comparison rather than value-comparison 
processes. 
 
Keywords: risky choice, inter-temporal choice, risky inter-temporal choice, cognitive 
modelling, hierarchical Bayesian modelling, decision making  
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Three elementary truths of human choice are that people tend to prefer certain rewards over 
risky ones, sooner rewards over later ones, and larger rewards over smaller ones. Such 
choices, in which one option dominates, are often straightforward. It is when the dimensions 
of risk, time and magnitude combine that choices become difficult (Vanderveldt, Green & 
Myerson, 2015). How does one choose between $100 with certainty today and a 25% chance 
of $600 in 3 months? More generally how does one choose between two options which differ 
in outcome (i.e. $100 vs. $600), probability of receiving those outcomes (i.e. 1.0 vs 0.25), and 
delay until receipt of those outcomes (i.e. 0 months vs. 3 months).  
 This class of problems – known as risky inter-temporal choices has attracted growing 
interest in the literature (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; 2012; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; 
Konstantinidis, van Ravenzwaaij, Guney, & Newell, 2019; Luckman, Donkin & Newell, 
2017, Sun & Li, 2010; Vanderveldt, Green & Myerson, 2015; Weber & Chapman, 2005a). 
This interest is unsurprising given that choices among risky inter-temporal prospects allow a 
unique opportunity for the development and expansion of theories that have typically only 
considered the effects of risk and time in isolation. In this paper we will focus on two areas of 
theory development where studying risky inter-temporal choice may be particularly 
informative. The first is the development of theories of how risk and delay relate to each 
other in choice.  Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) noted several commonalities between the 
effects of risk and time on choice. They argued that these choice-patterns reflect fundamental 
psychological properties of prospect evaluation that operate when there is uncertainty about 
either timing of prospect-receipt or probability of prospect-receipt. Risky inter-temporal 
choices allow us to investigate how these psychological properties manifest when those two 
types of uncertainty compete for attention. The second area in which risky inter-temporal 
choices may be particularly useful is in providing insight into how people process and 
integrate information across multiple attribute dimensions (i.e. risks, delay, amounts) and 
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multiple options. There is an ongoing debate in both the risky choice and inter-temporal 
choice literatures as to whether people make decisions primarily by comparing individual 
attribute values across risky/inter-temporal options- i.e. comparing risks to risks, amounts to 
amounts and delays to delays- or whether they compare risky/inter-temporal options by 
calculating some form of overall value or utility of each option, by combining information 
across the attribute dimensions (Cheng & Gonzallez-Vallejo, 2016; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart & 
Brown 2011). Because risky inter-temporal choices allow more complex trade-offs between 
amounts and risks or amounts and delays than are possible in choices that involve only risks 
or only delays, they generate novel circumstances in which mechanisms that produce the 
same effects in standard risky or inter-temporal choices, produce divergent behaviours. 
To address these theoretical questions in this paper we perform a comprehensive 
comparison of 7 different models of risky inter-temporal choice which utilize different mixes 
of attribute and utility comparisons. The models are compared based on the predictions they 
make for 3 prominent manipulations from the literature - magnitude, immediacy and certainty 
- across 6 different types of risky inter-temporal choices. The remainder of the introduction is 
structured as follows: first we explain the distinction between models which assume that 
utilities are compared versus models assuming that attributes are compared. We then outline 
how risky inter-temporal choice may be useful for discriminating between utility- and 
attribute-based accounts of the effect of outcome magnitude. Second, we introduce the 
immediacy and certainty effect, and summarize existing research into risky inter-temporal 
choice focusing on the similarities between risk and delay, and how this research has 
impacted model development. Third, we perform a comprehensive review of the current 
research on magnitude, immediacy and certainty effects for 6 different types of risky inter-
temporal choices. Finally, we provide details of the specifications we use for the 7 models 
compared in this paper, and outline their predictions. 
 5 
 
Attribute vs. Utility Comparisons 
In both the risky choice and inter-temporal choice literatures, models of choice are 
often grouped together into three broad classes based upon the way in which information 
from different attribute dimensions and choice options is integrated (Birnbaum & Lacroix, 
2008; Cheng & Gonzallez-Vallejo, 2016; Reeck, Wall & Johnson, 2017; Vlaev, Chater, 
Stewart & Brown 2011). The first of these classes, which we call utility comparison models, 
assume that people choose as if they have calculated the worth, or utility, of each of the 
options presented in a choice independently.  The exact way in which the utility of an option 
is calculated varies from model to model, but it involves combining the attributes of an option 
together into a single value, such as by multiplying the outcome by a discount rate based on 
its delay until receipt, like in the Hyperbolic Discounting model of inter-temporal choice 
(Mazur, 1987; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995), or multiplying subjective outcomes 
of a gamble by weights based on their probabilities, like in Prospect Theory for risky choice 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
The second class of models, attribute-comparison models, instead assume that people 
directly compare attribute values across options, for instance directly comparing the delay of 
one option to the delay of the other, and the amount of one option to the amount of the other, 
like in the trade-off model of inter-temporal choice (Scholten & Read, 2010). A decision is 
then made by comparing the differences on each dimension to each other. In other words, 
while utility models combine the attributes of each choice option to establish the worth of 
each option, then compare the option, an attribute model compares the two options on each 
attribute separately, then compares the attribute differences. These two classes of model can 
also be grouped into a broader class, often called integrative models, as they both integrate 
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information across both attributes and choice options, just in a different order (Birnbaum & 
Lacroix, 2008).  
The third class of models, called heuristic or lexicographic semi-order models, 
assume that information is not integrated across attribute dimensions, the options are 
compared on each attribute sequentially and independently, with a decision usually being 
made when any single attribute difference reaches some threshold (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, 
& Hertwig, 2006). Support for models of this type is somewhat mixed in the literature, with 
several model comparison studies showing poor support for them, so we do not consider 
them further (Birnbaum & Lacroix, 2008; Rieskamp, 2008).  
To date, all proposed models of risky inter-temporal choice belong to the class of 
utility-comparison models. These models- the Multiplicative Hyperboloid Discounting model 
(Vanderveldt, Green & Myerson, 2015), the Probability and Time Trade-off model (Baucells 
& Heukamp, 2010; 2012), and a modified version of the Rachlin’s Hyperbolic Discounting 
model that was used by Yi and colleagues (2006) - all build on existing utility-comparison 
models of risky or inter-temporal choice such as  Prospect Theory or Hyperbolic Discounting 
models. However, there is growing evidence  that attribute comparison models such as the 
Inter-Temporal Choice Heuristic (ITCH), Proportional Difference (PD) or Trade-off models, 
provide better accounts of inter-temporal choice behaviour than classic utility based models 
(Cheng & Gonzallez-Vallejo, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Ericson et al., 2014; Scholten, 
Read & Sanborn, 2014; but see Wulff & van den Bos, 2017). Given their success in 
explaining inter-temporal choice data, it seems likely that attribute-comparison models may 
also be useful in explaining risky inter-temporal choice. Furthermore, as we demonstrate in 
the next section, considering attribute-comparison processes in risky inter-temporal choice 
may increase our understanding of the comparison processes underlying choice in risk-only 




A standard inter-temporal choice (e.g., $50 now vs. $100 in 6 months) involves a 
trade-off between time and amount, as an individual chooses between a smaller sooner and a 
larger later outcome. A robust finding in these types of inter-temporal choices is that if you 
increase the magnitude of the outcomes of both options by multiplying them by a common 
multiplier, people become much more likely to choose the larger later option (Chapman & 
Weber, 2006; Green & Myerson, 2004; Myerson et al., 2003; Thaler, 1981; Vanderveldt, 
Green & Rachlin, 2015). For example, people show a greater preference to wait when 
choosing between $500 now and $1000 in 6 months, compared to a choice between $50 now 
and $100 in 6 months. This inter-temporal choice effect is referred to as the magnitude effect. 
 One issue that arises when trying to discriminate between attribute- and utility-
comparison processes is that both classes of models can capture effects like the magnitude 
effect, albeit using different mechanisms. For example utility-comparison models, like PTT, 
often assume that the rate at which people discount delayed outcomes decreases as a function 
of the amount of the outcome (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Myerson et al., 2003; Vincent, 
2016). In essence PTT assumes that time delays are scaled by the amount offered, so the 
same delay is treated as shorter the larger the outcome is. This type of explanation, where one 
attribute is allowed to affect the value/processing of another, is consistent with the underlying 
assumption of utility-comparison models, that the delay and amount information is integrated 
within each option. Attribute-comparison models, like the ITCH model, do not explain the 
magnitude effect in the same way, because such models assume that each attribute dimension 
is processed separately, and are not integrated. Instead, in the case of the ITCH model, the 
magnitude effect is captured by assuming that people consider, as part of their decision, the 
absolute difference in outcome between the two options (Ericson et al., 2014). Now, when 
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both outcomes are multiplied by a constant to produce the magnitude effect, the difference 
between the outcomes increases by the same constant, thus making the larger outcome 
relatively more attractive. 
In a classic inter-temporal choice the larger outcome is also the later outcome, as a 
consequence the two mechanisms in utility- and attribute-based models will produce the same 
qualitative effect, and so cannot be easily distinguished. However, in risky inter-temporal 
choices this confound between the larger and later outcome does not exist. For instance, 
consider giving a participant a choice between a smaller later but safer outcome (e.g. $50 in 6 
months for certain) and a larger sooner but riskier outcome ($100 now with probability 0.5). 
Because the PTT model assumes that the magnitude effect is caused by the delays being 
treated as shorter, multiplying both outcomes by 10 would predict that people shift towards 
preferring the smaller later safer outcome ($500 in 6 months for certain). Conversely, because 
the magnitude effect in the ITCH model is caused by an increased difference in amount 
between the two options, it instead predicts a shift towards the larger sooner riskier outcome 
($1000 now with probability 0.5). Therefore, risky inter-temporal choices provide a unique 
opportunity to discriminate between these two types of models because attribute-comparison 
models, by definition, do not allow manipulation of one attribute to change the processing of 
another attribute.  
However, we should note that utility-comparison models can produce effects of 
magnitude that occur purely by changing how amounts are processed. For example, consider 
a standard risky choice between a smaller but safer reward, and a larger but riskier reward 
(e.g $50 for certain or $100 with probability 0.5). In these types of risky choices multiplying 
both amounts by a common multiplier (e.g. 10) has generally been shown to make people 
more likely to choose the safer option (e.g. $500 for certain) (Green & Myerson, 2004; 
Markowitz, 1952; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt & Estle, 2003; Weber & Chapman, 2005b), 
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although not always (Chapman & Weber, 2006; Vanderveldt, Green & Rachlin, 2015). This 
is often referred to as the peanuts effect, as people are more willing to gamble when they are 
playing for peanuts, i.e. small amounts. The PTT model can also capture this effect, but not 
by assuming that outcome amounts change how probabilities are processed. Instead the PTT 
model assumes that when the utility of an outcome is calculated, objective outcomes (e.g. x) 
are transformed into subjective values (v(x)) by a concave value function with decreasing 
elasticity (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; 2012). Decreasing elasticity means that proportional 
increases in outcome magnitude, x, lead to smaller proportional increases in subjective value, 
v(x), for larger values of 𝑥 than for smaller values of x (Scholten & Read, 2014).  If we 
multiply both outcomes by a constant, e.g. 10, the subjective value of the smaller outcome, 
$50, will change by a greater multiplier than will the subjective value of the larger outcome, 
$100, leading to the smaller safer outcome becoming relatively more attractive when the 
outcome magnitudes are increased. 
Taken together, exploring the effects of outcome magnitude in risky inter-temporal 
choices has the potential to challenge the accounts of these effects provided by attribute-
comparison models, such as ITCH or the trade-off model. If we find a pattern of magnitude 
effects consistent with people becoming more or less willing to wait, or more or less willing 
to take a risk, this will rule out an attribute-comparison explanation for the effect. If we 
instead find patterns consistent with a general shift either towards or away from preferring the 
larger option, regardless of risk or delay, this would be compatible with either attribute or 
utility comparison processes.  
 
Relation between Risk & Delay 
While the distinction between attribute- and utility-comparison processes has 
generally not been investigated in risky inter-temporal choices, the same is not true of the 
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other area of focus of this paper – the relationship between risk and delay. Empirical 
investigations into risky inter-temporal choices have generally explicitly focused on 
exploring the similarities between risk and delay as a first step to developing theories of risky 
inter-temporal choice. Of particular interest has been the relationship between the certainty 
effect in risky choice, and the immediacy effect in inter-temporal choice. The certainty effect 
in risky choice – also called the common ratio effect – refers to the change in behaviour 
observed when the probabilities of the outcomes presented in a risky choice are reduced by a 
common ratio (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In general, people 
are more risk seeking when the probability of each outcome is reduced (by the same amount). 
For example, if most people prefer to take a certain $50 over $100 with probability 0.5, then 
fewer people prefer $50 with probability 0.2 over $100 with probability 0.1, i.e. when the 
probabilities are divided by 5. The immediacy effect is often considered analogous to the 
certainty effect, but for inter-temporal choice (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). Just as the 
certainty effect involves reducing probability by a common amount, the immediacy effect – 
also called the common difference effect1– involves increasing delays by a common amount, 
which leads to an increase in preference for the larger more delayed outcome (Kirby, 1997; 
Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992: Thaler, 1981). For example, if most 
people prefer to take $50 now, rather than wait 6 months for $100, fewer would prefer to take 
$50 in 12 months over $100 in 18 months. 
The similarity between these two effects has led several researchers to test the effects 
of certainty on inter-temporal choices, and vice versa. For instance Keren and Roelofsma 
(1995), among others (Weber & Chapman, 2005a), found that adding risk to an inter-
 
1 Some researchers distinguish between the immediacy and common difference effects, with the former only 
applying to situations where one of the options in the initial choice set was immediate, while the latter applies to 
situations where both options in the original set were delayed. Similar distinctions are made between the 
certainty and common ratio effects (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). We make no such distinction and use 
immediacy and certainty throughout, as they refer directly to the dimensions we manipulate. 
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temporal choice, had a similar effect to adding a common delay in that participants became 
more likely to choose the larger later option. However, not all studies have found this 
relationship (Sun & Li, 2010; Weber & Chapman, 2005a). Similarly, a variety of studies have 
found that adding a common delay to a risky choice has a similar effect to increasing the risk, 
in that participants became more likely to choose the larger riskier option (Baucells & 
Heukamp, 2010; Oshikoji, 2012; Sagristano, Trope & Liberman, 2002; Weber and 
Chapman,2005a). Again, however, not all studies find this effect (see Weber and Chapman, 
2005a). 
 More generally several researchers have hypothesized that inter-temporal choice 
behavior may be driven, partially or exclusively, by considerations of risk (Epper, Frehr-
Duda, & Bruhin, 2011; Sozou, 1998; Takahashi, Ikeda & Hasegawa, 2007). For instance, 
Takahashi and colleagues (2007) had participants directly estimate the risks associated with 
various delayed outcomes and found that these risk estimates can partially explain inter-
temporal behavior. Alternatively, risky choice behavior may be driven by considerations of 
delay, as events that are unlikely can also be thought of in terms of when they would be 
expected to occur, for instance a 1 in 100 year flood (Rachlin, 1989; Rachlin, Raineri & 
Cross, 1991). Regardless of the direction, these studies suggest that risk and delay may be 
treated as though they are equivalent. Two of the existing models of risky inter-temporal 
choice, the PTT model (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010;2012) and the Hyperbolic Discounting 
(HD) model of Yi, de la Piedad & Bickel (2006), have explicitly included this concept. The 
PTT model assumes that participants first translate time delays into risks and then treat their 
decision like a standard risky choice. In the HD model, risk is translated into expected delays 
until payment and the decision is treated like a standard inter-temporal choice. 
However, the evidence that risks and delays are treated like a single attribute 
dimension is far from conclusive. In addition to the several studies above which do not show 
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immediacy and certainty having the same impact on choice, a recent study found that people 
prefer delaying an outcome to taking a risk when the two are in direct competition, despite 
giving the risky and delayed outcome similar values in isolation (Luckman, Donkin & 
Newell, 2017).  In order to better understand how risk and delay are related, in this paper we 
examine the effects of immediacy and certainty manipulations across a variety of different 
type of risky inter-temporal choices.  
 
Risky Inter-temporal choice 
To understand how immediacy, certainty and magnitude manipulations impact 
behaviour in risky inter-temporal choices, we need to acknowledge that there is no single 
type of risky inter-temporal choice. While all risky choices, at least for single outcome 
gambles, involve a trade-off between probability and amount, and all inter-temporal choices a 
trade-off between delay and amount, risky inter-temporal choices can involve either, both, or 
neither of these trade-offs. For instance, in risky inter-temporal choices there can also/instead 
be trade-offs between delay and probability (e.g. safer or sooner), or choices where the 
amount and the probability or delay are complementary, rather than in competition, such as in 
the example we gave in the section on magnitude effects. In this paper we consider 6 
different types of risky inter-temporal choices. We define these types based upon which of 
the three attributes: risk/probability, time/delay and amount/outcome, are in competition with 
each other in a choice. Table 1 provides the structure and an illustrative example of each of 
the 6 choice types which we explain in more detail below. For each of these choice types we 





Table 1: Example of each of the 6 types of risky inter-temporal choices used in this paper, 
and the attributes which are in competition in each. 
Abbreviation Attribute Trade-off Example 
RvA Risk vs. Amount $50 in 6 months with probability 0.8 or $100 in 
6 months with probability 0.5 
DvA Delay vs. Amount $50 in 1 month with probability 0.5 or $100 in 6 
months with probability 0.5 
DvR Delay vs. Risk $50 in 1 month with probability 0.5 or $50 in 6 
months with probability 0.8 
DRvA Delay & Risk vs. 
Amount 
 
$50 in 1 month with probability 0.8 or $100 in 6 
months with probability 0.5 
RvAD Risk vs. Amount & 
Delay 
$50 in 6 months with probability 0.8 or $100 in 
1 month with probability 0.5 
DvAR Delay vs. Amount & 
Risk 
$50 in 1 month with probability 0.5 or $100 in 6 
months with probability 0.8 
 
Type 1: Risk vs. Amount (RvA). The first type of risky inter-temporal choice we consider 
involves a choice between a smaller safer outcome and a larger riskier outcome, just like a 
standard risky choice. However, unlike a typical risky choice instead of both options 
occurring now, both occur after some common delay (e.g. $50 in 6 months with probability 
0.8 or $100 in 6 months with probability 0.5). Typical risky choices could therefore be 
considered a special subset of this type of risky inter-temporal choice. 
To some extent all three of the effects listed above have been explored in this choice 
type. In Baucells and Heukamp (2010) participants were given various Risk vs. Amount 
choices involving different outcomes, probability levels and common delays. Even ignoring 
those that could be classed as standard risky choices, in general they found that more people 
preferred the safer/certain option when the outcome amounts were increased – the peanuts 
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effect – and more people preferred the riskier option when either the probabilities were 
reduced – the certainty effect –, or the common delay was longer – the immediacy effect. The 
effect of common delay in Risk vs. Amount choices has also been found in other studies 
(Oshikoji, 2012; Sagristano, Trope & Liberman, 2002), although not always reliably, with 
Weber and Chapman (2005a) finding the effect in a choice titration task, but not when using 
a single choice design like that in Baucells and Heukamp (2010). 
 
Type 2: Delay vs. Amount (DvA). Just as the first type of risky inter-temporal choice 
contains standard risky choice as a subset, the second contains standard inter-temporal 
choice. Like an inter-temporal choice, Delay vs. Amount choices involve a choice between a 
smaller sooner outcome, and a larger later outcome, however both can be occurring with 
some common probability, rather than only with certainty (e.g. $50 in 1 month with 
probability 0.5 or $100 in 6 months with probability 0.5). Keren and Roelofsma (1995) 
looked at both certainty and immediacy effects in such a design. They found the usual 
immediacy effect observed in inter-temporal choices, with participants preferring the larger 
later option more if a common 26-week delay was added to both options. They also found a 
certainty effect, with participants preferring to take the larger later option more if the 
common probability was lower. 
Weber and Chapman (2005a) had the same issues replicating the certainty effect in 
Delay vs. Amount choices as they did the immediacy effect in Risk vs. Amount Choices. 
Furthermore, Sun and Li (2010) found the opposite effect of certainty with the smaller sooner 




Type 3: Delay vs. Risk (DvR). There are also risky inter-temporal choices where the amount 
is constant across options. These choices are between a riskier sooner outcome and a safer 
later outcome (e.g. $50 now with probability 0.5 or $50 in 6 months for certain). Magnitude 
effects have been investigated in the subset of these choices that involve a certain later option 
and a risky immediate option, as shown in the example. In such choices, increasing the 
magnitude of the outcomes results in either stronger preference for the certain later option, a 
willingness to wait longer for the delayed outcome, or a reduction in tolerance for risk when 
choosing the risky outcome – depending upon the method used (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; 
Christensen et al, 1998; Luckman et al., 2017). All three effects are in the same direction, and 
all are consistent with both the magnitude effect as observed in inter-temporal choice, and the 
peanuts effect as observed in risky choice. 
 
Type 4: Delay and Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). The only other choice type in which any of 
these effects has been investigated are choices between a smaller safer sooner outcome and a 
larger riskier later outcome (e.g., $50 now for certain or $100 in 6 months with probability 
0.5). Vanderveldt, Green and Myerson (2015) looked at the effects of magnitude in a specific 
subset of such choices, where the smaller safer sooner option is both certain and immediate, 
as it is in our example. In general, they found very little effect of magnitude, although there 
were two instances in which people behaved differently when the magnitude of the outcomes 
was increased. First, when the larger riskier later option was made certain, thus creating a 
simple inter-temporal choice, they found the usual magnitude effect in inter-temporal choice, 
with participants valuing the larger later option relatively more than the smaller sooner option 
as outcome magnitudes increased. However, this relative increase in value for the larger later 
option with increasing outcome magnitudes was not present when the riskier option was 
anything but certain. Secondly, if the later option involved a relatively small delay, i.e. 1 
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month or 6 months (compared to delays of 2 or 5 years), then increasing the amount led to 
preferences in the same direction as the peanuts effect, with participants valuing the larger 
riskier later option relatively less. 
In contrast to Vanderveldt et al., (2015), Yi et al. (2006) found that increasing the 
magnitude of all outcomes increased the attractiveness of the larger riskier later option. 
Showing an increased preference for the later option is consistent with the magnitude effect 
in inter-temporal choice, however, since the more delayed option was also riskier, an 
increased preference for such a gamble is inconsistent with the peanuts effect of risky choice.  
 
Types 5 & 6: Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD); Delay vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR). We 
know of no studies that have investigated these final two choice types. The first type of 
choice involves a choice between a smaller safer later option and a larger riskier sooner 
option (Risk vs. Amount & Delay; e.g., $50 in 6 months for certain or $100 now with 
probability 0.5). This choice type is particularly interesting for discriminating between 
accounts of the magnitude effect which assume it is due to changes in attitude to delay, 
versus those that it explain it based on amount effects. The second is between a smaller 
riskier sooner option and a larger safer later option (Delay vs. Amount & Risk; e.g., $50 now 
with probability 0.5 or $100 in 6 months for certain). As we will show, existing models do 
make predictions for these types of choices, but their predictions are yet to be tested against 
empirical data.  
 
Risky Inter-temporal Choice Models 
 In addition to the three existing models of risky inter-temporal choice- MHD 
(Vanderveldt, Green & Myerson, 2015), PTT (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; 2012), and HD 
(Yi et al., 2006) - we consider 4 additional models based on extensions of popular models of 
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risky or inter-temporal choice.  The first of these is a simple combination of Prospect Theory 
and Hyperbolic Discounting. These are, respectively, the most popular models of risky choice 
and inter-temporal choice in the literature, and all three existing risky inter-temporal choice 
models include modified components of one of them. As such we include this model as a 
baseline comparison model, as it involves a relatively straightforward combination of popular 
risky and inter-temporal models, with no consideration of the risky inter-temporal choice 
literature. 
The next three models we consider all involve some element of an attribute-
comparison process. The first is a hybrid model proposed by Scholten and Read (2014). This 
model is an extension of their Trade-off model of inter-temporal choice (Scholten & Read, 
2010) to allow it to capture risky choice. We separate this from the other 3 existing models of 
risky inter-temporal choice as unlike them, it has never been fit to data. The second attribute-
based model is an extension of the ITCH model (Ericson et al., 2015) to account for risky 
inter-temporal choice. We call this model the Risky Inter-Temporal Choice Heuristic 
(RITCH) model. We include this model due to the recent success of ITCH in a comparison 
with other popular models of inter-temporal choice (Ericson et al., 2014, although see Wulff 
& van den Bos, 2017 for a conflicting perspective). The third model is a version of the 
Proportional Difference (PD) model (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002). Other versions of this model 
have previously been used for both risky choice (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002), and for inter-
temporal choices (Cheng & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014), but not risky 
inter-temporal choice. 
In the following section, we formally define the seven models we will compare. We 
will also outline the predictions each model makes about the effect that immediacy, certainty 
and magnitude manipulations will have in each of the six types of risky inter-temporal 
choices. The qualitative predictions each model makes for the immediacy, certainty, and 
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magnitude effects are given in Tables 2 to 4, respectively. By examining these predictions 
across all our candidate models, we build up a detailed picture of how and why (or why not) 
each model can explain the three signature effects. Mapping this landscape provides 
important insights into how people trade off risk, time and reward. 
 
Utility-comparison models. Utility models assume that decisions are made by comparing the 
utility, or worth, of each option presented. This is achieved by first calculating the utility of 
each option, then choosing the option with the greater utility, with some probability (Stott, 
2006). Consider an option, g(x, p), consisting of an outcome, x, occurring with some 
probability, 𝑝. According to Prospect Theory, the utility of this option, U(x, p), is the product 
of a value function, v(x), and a probability weighting function, w(p), i.e.  𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙
𝑤(𝑝). Here, the value function is a means of transforming objective outcomes into subjective 
values, while the probability weighting function transforms objective probabilities into 
decision weights. Different specifications are used for these two functions throughout the 
literature, but the former is always a concave function, such as 
𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑎        (1) 
where 0 ≤ a < 1, and the latter is always an s-shaped function, such as  
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒−(− ln 𝑝)
𝑟
      (2) 
where 0 < r ≤ 1 (Rieskamp, 2008; Stott, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Decreasing a 
increases the concavity of the value function, or the extent to which participants show 
diminishing sensitivity to increasing amounts, while decreasing r increases the sub-
proportionality of probability weighting, or the degree to which small probabilities are 
overweighted and medium to large probabilities underweighted. When a = 1 the subjective 
value of an outcome is equal to its objective value and when r = 1 decision weights are equal 
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to objective probabilities. Details on the psychological meaning and interpretation of all 
parameters for all models are contained in Table A2 in Appendix A. 
Once the utility of each option has been calculated, the difference between the utilities 
is used to make a decision. While this decision was historically considered to be 
deterministic, with the option with the greater utility always chosen, it is generally now 
accepted that choice is stochastic, with the difference in utilities instead translated into a 
probability of choosing one option over the other (Hey, 1995; Loomes & Sugden, 1994).  The 
probability of choosing the first gamble, g1, is obtained by passing the difference in utilities 
through a choice function such as; 
 𝑃(𝑔1|{𝑔1,  𝑔2}) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑠(𝑈(𝑔1)−𝑈(𝑔2))
     (3) 
where the sensitivity parameter, s ≥ 0 determines how deterministic choice is. Note that most 
choice functions used in the literature assume that the probabilistic decision rule is based on 
the absolute difference in utilities (Stott, 2006).  
Turning to inter-temporal choices, we note that the Hyperbolic Discounting model is 
similar to Prospect theory, except that the utility of an option, g(x, t), where t is the delay 
before receiving the outcome, x, is the product of a value function and a discount function, 
𝑈(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ 𝑑(𝑡). A hyperbolic discounting function is used to transform objective time, 




       (4) 
where h ≥ 0. The discount rate, h, measures the extent to which outcomes lose their value per 
unit of time they are delayed. High values of h indicate that outcomes are discounted steeply 
as a function of time, losing value quickly when delayed, while h = 0 indicates no 
discounting, with delays essentially ignored. When applied to inter-temporal choices, the 
value function of the Hyperbolic Discounting model is often set to the identity function, for 
instance by setting a = 1 in Equation 1 (Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995). 
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A simple way to create a utility model that can deal with risky inter-temporal choices 
is therefore to assume that the utility is the product of all three components: the value 
function (Equation 1), the decision weight function (Equation 2), and the discount rate 
function (Equation 4), 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ 𝑤(𝑝) ∙ 𝑑(𝑡) (see Vanderveldt, Green & Myerson, 
2015, for a discussion of whether the combination of these functions should be multiplicative 
or additive).2 A consequence of this combination is that it forces the assumption of a single 
value function for both risks and delays. The assumption of a single value function is 
supported in Luckman, Donkin and Newell (2015; 2018), where risky choices and inter-
temporal choices were found to have the same, usually concave, value function, although 
some participants did exhibit linear (a = 1), or slightly convex (a > 1) functions. As such we 
use Equation 1 but assume only that a ≥ 0, rather than also constraining it to be less than 1, 
therefore removing the constraint that the value function must be concave. We also need to 
specify a choice function; in this case we use Equation 3.3 We refer to this model as the 
Prospect Theory and Hyperbolic Discounting model (PTHD) throughout. 
 
Multiplicative Hyperboloid Discounting model. The Multiplicative Hyperboloid Discounting 
(MHD) model proposed by Vanderveldt, Green and Myerson (2015) is an existing model of 
risky inter-temporal choice. Just like the PTHD model, MHD assumes that the utility of an 
option is the product of a discount rate, value function and decision weight, however it differs 
in the specification of these functions. In particular, MHD uses a 2-parameter S-shaped 
weighting function, 
 
2 Empirically Vanderveldt et al. (2015), find that a multiplicative form fits their risky inter-temporal data better 
than an additive form such as 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ [1 − 𝑤(𝑝)] − 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ [1 − 𝑑(𝑡)].  Furthermore the 
additive form is theoretically problematic as, for a gamble with a positive outcome, 𝑣(𝑥) > 0, it will produce a 
negative Utility whenever  𝑤(𝑝) + 𝑑(𝑡) < 1. This is easily achieved for combinations of moderate delays and 
low probabilities. This issue does not occur with the multiplicative form. 
3 The combination of probability, value and choice functions given by Equations1-3 is the combination 






𝑝⁄  − 1))
𝑠𝑟      (5) 





       (6) 
where sd ≥ 0 and hd ≥ 0. The parameters sd and sr measure sensitivity to delays and risks, 
respectively, with values less than 1 representing diminishing sensitivity. hr and hd are 
discount rate parameters, similar to Equation 4, except that hr measures discounting as a 
function of odds against receiving the outcome, rather than as a function of delay. This model 
can account for basic patterns of risky inter-temporal choice data, but its performance has not 
been compared to other models of risky inter-temporal choice (Vanderveldt, Green & 
Myerson, 2015). The MHD model outperforms the Hyperbolic Discounting models in its 
ability to fit to pure inter-temporal choice data and pure risky choice data (Green & Myerson, 
2004; Myerson et al, 2003).  
This base version of MHD does not incorporate any magnitude effects. However, 
variants of this model have been used to investigate the magnitude effect in inter-temporal 
choice, and the peanuts effect in risky choice. In the former, it is generally found that the 
discount rate parameter, hd, changes as function of the magnitude of the reward, while in the 
latter it is the sensitivity parameter, sr, which changes (Myerson et al., 2003; Myerson, Green 
& Morris, 2011). While no modification of the discount rate has been proposed to account for 
this change, Myerson et al. (2011) proposed to make the probability weighting function 
depend on amount, allowing the model to account for the peanuts effect; 




𝑝⁄  − 1))
𝑠𝑟𝑥
𝑐     (7) 
 Where c ≥ 0, and measures diminishing sensitivity to amounts. For the version of 
MHD we use in this paper, we therefore assume that the utility of an option is a multiplicative 
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combination of Equation 1, 6 and 7.4  Furthermore, though no choice function has been 
proposed for the MHD model, we will use Equation 3 to make the PTHD and MHD models 
more comparable. 
 
Translation Models. We now consider the two other existing utility-based models of risky 
inter-temporal choice.  These models make substantially different assumptions about how 
risk and delay combine in choice. In particular, rather than multiplying together a decision 
weight and discount rate function, these models assume that there is a function translating 
one of the attributes, risk or delay, into levels of the other attribute. 
In the Hyperbolic Discounting (HD) model of Yi and colleagues (2006) it is assumed 
that risk is transformed into a delay, which is then added to the existing level of delay before 
a discount function is applied, such that 
 𝑑(𝑡, 𝑝) =
1
1 + ℎ(𝑡 + 𝑖(1 𝑝⁄  − 1))
      (8)  
with i  ≥ 0 and h ≥ 0. Since risks are incorporated into the discount function, there is no 
probability weighting function, and we have 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ 𝑑(𝑡, 𝑝), with v(x) calculated 
from Equation 1. The transformation used in this model is based on Rachlin, Raineri and 
Cross (1991), who proposed that a Hyperbolic Discounting function could explain both inter-
temporal choice and risky choice behaviour, if probability is translated into a delay, 𝑡𝑝 =
𝑖(1 𝑝⁄ − 1) where i is the inter-trial interval, i.e. the amount of time between each play of the 
gamble, which is treated as a free parameter in our model.5 This transformation assumes that 
 
4 In the versions of MHD typically used in previous papers the exponent of the value function, a, cannot be 
separated from the sensitivity exponents, sr and sd, as the parameters of the model are normally estimated based 
on obtaining certainty equivalents of risky and/or inter-temporal options (See Myerson et al., 2011). Because we 
assume participants compare the utility of the options presented, rather than their certainty equivalents, we 
estimate a separately from, sr and sd. 
5 We made two alterations to the Hyperbolic Discounting model as reported in Yi et al. (2006). Firstly, Yi and 
colleagues assumed a value of 35.3 for i, as this was the value found by Rachlin et al. (1991). As there is no 
reason to assume i should be stable across experiments or participants, we instead assume i is a free parameter. 
Secondly the original formulation, consistent with the standard Hyperbolic Discounting model, assumed an 
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risky choices are made by calculating the amount of time it would take, on average, to 
achieve the desired amount, if the gamble was repeated multiple times (Vanderveldt, Green 
& Rachlin, 2015). Larger values of i, therefore, lead to a more negative view of risk as the 
inferred delay is longer. Vanderveldt, Green and Myerson (2015) also motivate their 
probability weighting function in the MHD model on the same idea of transforming risks into 
delays, although they replace the assumption that risk and delay are interchangeable and 
combined, with the notion that the outcome value should be discounted separately based on 
the transformed risk and the delay. The discount rate parameter, h, from Equation 8 has the 
same interpretation as the discount rate in the pure hyperbolic model in Equation 4, except 
that it takes into account both the objective delay, and delay inferred from the risk. 
The second translation model we fit is the Probability and Time Trade-off (PTT) 
model, proposed by Baucells and Heukamp (2010; 2012). In the PTT, delays are combined 
with probabilities in the weighting function 
𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑒
−(𝑅𝑡 |𝑥|⁄ −ln 𝑝)
𝛾
     (9) 
where R ≥ 0 and 0 ≤  ≤ 1, which means there is no separate discounting function and 
therefore 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ 𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡, 𝑥). Here 𝑅/|𝑥| is the discount rate for time, similar to h 
in the hyperbolic models, with larger values of R indicating more discounting. However, 
unlike h, the discount rate in Equation 9 also decreases as a function of the amount. As 
discussed previously, by making the discount rate amount dependent the PTT model has the 
ability to predict inter-temporal magnitude effects (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010). The second 
parameter, , measures sub-proportionality and has the same interpretation as r from Equation 
2. Another critical difference between PTT and the other utility models is the use of a two-
parameter concave value function 
 
identity function for the value function. We relax this assumption, instead using a power function (Equation 1) 
as previous research has found little support for linear or identity value functions (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; 
Luckman et al., 2015; 2018). 
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       (10) 
with  ≤ 1 and  > 0, instead of the power function employed in other models. An 
important difference between the power function (Equation 1) and the expo-power function 
(Equation 10) is that the former has constant elasticity, while the latter has decreasing 
elasticity (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Scholten & Read, 2014). Decreasing elasticity means 
that proportional increases in outcome magnitude, x, lead to smaller proportional increases in 
subjective value, v(x), for larger values of 𝑥 than for smaller values of x (Scholten & Read, 
2014). In contrast, constant elasticity means that the proportional change in subjective value, 
v(x), is the same regardless of the value of x. In practice, the use of Equation 10 allows the 
PTT model to capture some “peanuts” type effects. Equation 10 can also produce constant 
elasticity when  approaches 0. The concavity, or extent of diminishing sensitivity to 
amount, in Equation 10 is controlled by both  and  with the concavity of the function 
decreasing as  decreases or  increases.  
The translations/combinations of risk and delay proposed by both Equation 8 and 
Equation 9 are motivated by the observed certainty effects in inter-temporal choice/Delay vs. 
Amount choices (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995) and immediacy effects in risky choice/Risk vs. 
Amount choices (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010). Both equations assume that adding a common 
delay has the same effect as dividing by a common probability, and vice versa. Since neither 
function has previously been paired with a choice function, we use Equation 3 to calculate 
choice probabilities to make it comparable to the other models. 
 
Attribute-comparison Models. In attribute based models of choice, the two options in any 
given gamble are not evaluated independently. Instead, it is assumed that participants directly 
compare the difference in attributes (i.e., the level of risk, delay, and amount) between the 
two options. These differences are then considered evidence in favour of one option or the 
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other, depending upon the direction of the difference. Several attribute-comparison models 
have been proposed, such as the Stochastic Proportional Difference model (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 
2002) used in risky choice, or the DRIFT (Read, Frederick & Scholten, 2013), Trade-off 
(Scholten & Read, 2010), and ITCH (Ericson et al., 2015) models in inter-temporal choice.  
To our knowledge the only existing, albeit empirically untested, model of risky inter-
temporal choice that uses an attribute comparison process, is the modified version of the 
Trade-off model suggested by Scholten and Read (2014). This model can be considered a 
hybrid of an attribute-comparison and utility-comparison model, as it reduces to their inter-
temporal Trade-off model (Scholten & Read, 2010) – an attribute comparison model – when 
dealing with pure inter-temporal choices, and to a version of Prospect Theory –a utility 
comparison model – when dealing with pure risky choices (Scholten & Read, 2014). 
Like the PTHD and MHD models, the Trade-off model assumes that objective 




      (11) 
with 0 <  ≤ 1, and that objective outcomes are transformed into subjective values by a 
concave value function with decreasing elasticity, 
 𝑣(𝑥) =  
1
𝛽
∙ ln(1 + 𝛽𝑥)      (12) 
with   > 0. Further, these subjective values and decision weights are multiplied together as 
they are in a utility model, 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑝) = 𝑣(𝑥) ∙ 𝑤𝑝(𝑝). The interpretation of  is similar to other 
sub-proportionality parameters, such as r from Equation 2, while increasing  increases 
diminishing sensitivity to amount. 
 The Trade-off model differs from utility models in how delays are used in the 
decision. Firstly, the Trade-off model assumes that objective delays are translated into time-
weights, which show diminishing sensitivity to delay, 
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 𝑤𝑡(𝑡) =  
1
𝜏
∙ ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡)      (13) 
with   > 0, and diminishing sensitivity to delay increasing as  increases. Rather than 
multiplying the utility by these time-weights, instead a weighted difference of the time-
weights is calculated, 
 𝑄(𝑡𝑆, 𝑡𝐿) =
𝜅
𝛼





)    (14) 
where tS and tL are the delays to the sooner and later options, respectively, and   ≥ 0,   > 0, 
and ϑ  ≥ 1.  is a free parameter scaling differences in time to differences in utility, which 
could be interpreted as relative sensitivity to time versus utility differences, while  and ϑ 
measure subadditivity and superadditivity respectively (see Table A2 for further details on 
the interpretation of the parameters). In order to calculate the probability of choosing the 
gamble with the later outcome, 𝑃(𝑔𝐿|𝑔𝐿 , 𝑔𝑆), this weighted time difference, Q(tS, tL) 
(Equation 14), is then compared to the difference in utility between the later option and 
sooner option, 
𝑈(𝑔𝐿) − 𝑈(𝑔𝑆) =  𝑣(𝑥𝐿) ∙ 𝑤𝑝(𝑝𝐿) − 𝑣(𝑥𝑆) ∙ 𝑤𝑝(𝑝𝑆)  (15) 
where the S and L subscripts denote the attributes of the gamble with the sooner outcome, gS, 
and later outcome, gL, respectively. To be consistent with the other models under evaluation, 
we assume that P(gL | gL, gS) is generated by taking the difference between the utility 
difference (Equation 15) and the weighted time difference (Equation 14), and passing it 
through the logistic choice function from Equation 3, giving 




    (16)  
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One advantage of using this specification for the choice function is that it can accommodate 
choices where both the utility difference and weighted time difference favour the same 
option.6 The final two models we consider rely purely on attribute-comparisons. 
 
Risky Inter-Temporal Choice Heuristic Model. We chose the ITCH model as the basis for 
our attribute-based risky inter-temporal choice model because it is one of the few models that 
considers both absolute and relative differences in attribute levels, with most existing 
attribute comparison models considering only one or the other. For instance, the other pure 
attribute comparison model we evaluate, the PD model (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002), assumes 
that only the relative, or proportional differences in attribute levels, are considered, while the 
Trade-off model uses transformed absolute differences in attribute levels (Scholten & Read, 
2010). The advantage of assuming that participants are sensitive to both absolute and relative 
differences in attributes across options is that this naturally produces a similar effect to 
assuming diminishing sensitivity to the attribute. For instance, the absolute difference 
between $10 and $11 is the same as the absolute difference between $100 and $101, however 
the relative difference in amounts is much greater in the former case. A model which is 
sensitive to both types of differences will, overall, treat the amount differences as greater for 
the two smaller amounts due to the greater relative difference. This is similar to a model 
which assumes diminishing sensitivity to amounts, i.e. a concave value function. 
In the original ITCH model, it is assumed that participants consider both the absolute 
and relative differences in the two attributes, delay and amount, when making inter-temporal 
 
6 Scholten et al (2014), use a different, proportional, choice function when using the inter-temporal trade-off 
model. This choice function is integral to some of the predictions their model makes in Scholten et al. (2014). 
To use this function we would need to insure that both the utility difference and time-weight difference were 
always positive (i.e. they favour different options), which is not possible in our choice set. As such, our risky 
inter-temporal Trade-off model does not reduce to the inter-temporal Trade-off model when dealing with pure 
inter-temporal choices. 
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choices. Specifically, they take a weighted sum of the absolute and relative difference in 
amount between the two options,  
𝑋 =  𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝑅
𝑥1−𝑥2
𝑥𝑚




 , and the weighted sum of the absolute and relative differences in time 
between the two options,  
𝑇 =  𝛽𝑡𝐴(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) + 𝛽𝑡𝑅
𝑡2−𝑡1
𝑡𝑚




. Both xm and tm are reference points for calculating the relative difference 
components. The various  parameters are the weights given to each of the differences in 
attributes, and all   ≥ 0. Psychologically, the relative values of the  parameters allow the 
model to place different weights, or importance, on different attributes, i.e. delays or 
amounts, and different comparison types, i.e. relative or absolute. A choice function is then 
used to calculate the probability of choosing option 1 over option 2, 𝑃(𝑔1|𝑔1,  𝑔2) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝑋+𝑇+𝛽𝑂)
, where O represents an overall bias, such that if  O > 0 the participant has a 
bias towards the larger option, if O < 0 the participant has a bias for the sooner option.  
Since the ITCH model was developed for inter-temporal choice data, we had to make 
two modifications to allow it to deal with risks in choice. First, analogous to the way that the 
ITCH model deals with delay, we propose that participants also incorporate a weighted sum 
of the absolute and relative differences in probabilities between the two options 
𝑅 =  𝛽𝑝𝐴(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝛽𝑝𝑅
𝑝1−𝑝2
𝑝𝑚




, pA ≥ 0 and pR ≥ 0. Second, we proposed a change to the bias parameter. 
Rather than a single bias parameter, RITCH has three bias parameters, xO, a bias towards the 
larger option, tO, a bias towards the sooner option and , pO, a bias towards the safer option. 
We add these bias parameters to equations 17-19, resulting in: 
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𝑋 =  𝛽𝑥𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝑅
𝑥1−𝑥2
𝑥𝑚
    (20) 
𝑇 =  𝛽𝑡𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) + 𝛽𝑡𝐴(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) + 𝛽𝑡𝑅
𝑡2−𝑡1
𝑡𝑚
     (21) 
𝑅 = 𝛽𝑝𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) +  𝛽𝑝𝐴(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝛽𝑝𝑅
𝑝1−𝑝2
𝑝𝑚
    (22) 
All three bias parameters are constrained to be non-negative, but are multiplied by the sign of 
the difference in attribute value they are linked to, so that xO always increases preference for 
the option with the larger amount, tO preference for the option with the shorter delay and pO 
for the option with the least risk. If there is no difference in the value of an attribute across 
options, e.g. 𝑥1 = 𝑥2, then the corresponding bias parameter is multiplied by 0, i.e. sgn(0)  =
 0. Therefore, the 3 bias parameters are combined in a unique way for each of our 6 types of 
risky inter-temporal choice.  
The need for a unique bias for each of the 6 types of risky inter-temporal choices, as 
they involve different trade-offs between attributes, is the reason that we use 3 bias 
parameters instead of 1. In the original ITCH model a single bias parameter is sufficient, and 
identifiable, as only one trade-off is ever encountered by the model, that between delay and 
amount. Therefore O, this single bias, is the bias for preferring the larger later over the 
smaller sooner option. In our model we can also identify the bias for preferring the larger 
later option over the smaller sooner by taking the difference between xO, the bias for the 
larger option, and tO, the bias for the sooner option (this difference, like O, can be positive 
or negative depending which bias is greater). A similar single bias parameter based on 
amount and delay would be insufficient for risky inter-temporal choices as it could not 
capture bias due to risk, such as the bias to prefer a larger later safer option over a smaller 
sooner riskier option. Further, a single bias parameter would be undefined for choices where 
there was no trade-off between delay and amount, either because one of these attributes does 
not vary between the options (DvR and RvA choices) or because delay and amount favour 
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the same option (RvAD choices). An alternative to the 3 bias parameter model we propose, 
would be a 6 bias parameter model, with a unique bias for each of the 6 types of risky inter-
temporal choices. For simplicity, we use a 3 parameter variant. 
Similar to the ITCH model the attribute differences  X (Equation 20), T (Equation 21), 
and R (Equation 22) are summed and passed through the logistic choice function to calculate 
preferences.7 
𝑃(𝑔1|𝑔1,  𝑔2) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝑋+𝑇+𝑅)
      (23) 
 
Proportional Difference Model. The final model we consider is a version of the Proportional 
Difference (PD) model. This model was chosen because, while it has not been used for risky 
inter-temporal choices or for comparisons that involve more than two attributes, versions of it 
have been used for both risky choices (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002) and inter-temporal choices 
(Cheng & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014) separately. Furthermore, the 
risky inter-temporal version of the PD model we propose can be considered a simplification 
or modification of the RITCH model above. Unlike the RITCH model the PD model assumes 
that people only consider the relative difference in attribute values- risks, delays and 
amounts- across the two options, rather than both relative and absolute differences. It 
therefore presents a psychologically simpler comparison process, where each pair of attribute 
values is only considered once. To obtain the PD model from the RITCH model we modify 
the reference points– xm, pm and tm  – so that the maximum, rather than mean value is used
8, 
 
7 An alternative, but equivalent, specification of the RITCH model would be to constrain the 6 weighting 
parameters to sum to 1. This would reduce the number of directly estimated weighting parameters to 5, as the 
6th would be determined by the other 5. However, this specification would then require an additional sensitivity 
parameter, to capture the fact that participants may have the same relative weighting of attributes, but differ in 
how deterministically they behave based on this weighting. Mathematically these models are equivalent. A 
similar alternate specification could be employed for the PD model below. 
8 We also tested a variant which used the mean value as the reference point. The maximum reference version 
outperformed the mean reference version for all three effects. While the maximum is often used, this is not a key 
feature of the general PD model. The minimum value has also been used as a reference point (Dai & 
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and simplify Equations 20-22 so that only relative differences in attribute values are 
considered in the difference calculations, removing the absolute components  
𝑋 =  𝛽𝑥𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝑅
𝑥1−𝑥2
max (𝑥1, 𝑥2)
      (24) 
𝑇 =  𝛽𝑡𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) + 𝛽𝑡𝑅
𝑡2−𝑡1
max (𝑡1, 𝑡2)
      (25) 
𝑅 = 𝛽𝑝𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) +  𝛽𝑝𝑅 ×
𝑝1−𝑝2
max (𝑝1, 𝑝2)
     (26) 
The weights given to each relative difference- xR, tR and pR - and the bias parameters - xO, 
tO and pO - are all constrained to be non-negative, as they are in Equations 20-22. Equations 
24 to 26 are then summed and passed to the choice function (Equation 23), as they are in the 
RITCH model.  
 This version of the PD model differs from the more commonly used variants in three 
ways. First, it involves three attribute comparisons, X, T and R, rather than just two, such as X 
and T (Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002) or X and R (Cheng & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2016). Second, and 
as a consequence, it employs a different bias method, as the threshold or bias mechanism 
usually employed in the PD model is similar to that of the original ITCH model, and 
therefore is not appropriate for use in a situation that involves potential biases for three 
different attributes. The third major difference is that we allow the different attributes to be 
given different relative weights (i.e. xR, pR and tR) , which is the approach employed by 
Dai and Busemeyer (2014), and makes the PD model more comparable to the RITCH model. 
The psychological interpretation of the parameters of the PD model are similar to those of the 




Busemeyer, 2014) and the reference point can also be treated as a free parameter which might be based on the 
broader choice context or other considerations (Cheng & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2016; Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002). 
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Experiment 
In the above Sections, we introduced 6 different types of risky inter-temporal choices 
(see Table 1) and considered 3 manipulations, magnitude, certainty and immediacy, which 
can be applied to them. Furthermore, we introduced 7 potential models of risky inter-
temporal choice. In the following experiment, we test each model’s ability to predict the 
effects of each of the three manipulations in all 6 choice types. This is done both 
quantitatively, by comparing the models fits, and qualitatively, by considering the broad 
predictions each model makes about the effects of each manipulation.  
 In Tables 2 to 4 we consider each of the three manipulations, magnitude, certainty and 
immediacy, and outline how each model predicts participants’ preferences will change when 
the manipulation is applied, relative to a baseline set of choices. This is done separately for 
each of the 6 choice types. Table 2 outlines how participants’ preferences are expected to 
change if all outcomes are multiplied by 10, i.e. the magnitude manipulation. Table 3 outlines 
predicted preference changes when a common 12-month delay is added to all choices, the 
immediacy manipulation, and Table 4 the changes when all probabilities in the choice set are 
divided by 5, the certainty manipulation. 
 The predictions outlined in Tables 2 to 4 for each model are described in more detail 
in the Supplemental Materials. To provide an example we will briefly outline the predictions 
for the PTHD and RITCH models for each manipulation and choice type.  
 
Magnitude. Neither the version of Prospect Theory nor the Hyperbolic Discounting model 
that PTHD is based on can account for either peanuts or magnitude effects, because neither 
the probability-weighting function (Equation 2), nor discounting function (Equation 4), are 
affected by outcome amount, and the power value function (Equation 1), has constant 
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elasticity which preserves the order of utilities. As such, PTHD predicts no directional effects 
of the magnitude manipulation (see top row of Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Predicted shift in preferences caused by the magnitude manipulation for each choice 
type. The predictions of each model are on a separate row. Words in bold indicate the 
attribute driving the effect. Words in italics indicate an attribute that predicts a shift in the 
opposite direction. The Data row shows the observed direction in which participants’ 
preferences shifted (on the group level) in the Experiment, and whether this was significant 
according to a Logistic General Linear Mixed Effect Model explained in the results. 
Model RvA† DvA† DvR† RvAD† DvAR† DRvA† 




























































PD No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change 
Data Non-sig: 





(p < .001, 
pad j< .001) 
Safer- 
Later 
(p < .001, 




(p < .001, 




(p < .001, 
pad j< .001) 
Non-sig: 
(p = .801, 
padj = 1) 
† R=Risk, D=Delay, A=Amount. 
 
 
9 To control the family wise error rate across our 6 tests of the magnitude effect we used the Holm-Bonferroni 
method (Holm, 1979) to calculate adjusted p-values. Using this method the unaltered p-values are first ordered 
from lowest to highest, then adjusted values calculated using 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑗(𝑖) = min(1, max
𝑗≤𝑖
([𝑚 − 𝑗 + 1] ∙ 𝑝(𝑗))), where 
m is the total number of tests, in this case 6, p(j) is the jth lowest p-value, and padj(i) is the adjusted value of the ith 
lowest p-value. The same method was used to calculate adjusted p-values for the immediacy and certainty effect 
tests. 
 34 
The quantitative predictions of PTHD is more nuanced than reflected in Table 2, 
however. The PTHD model predicts that the magnitude manipulations will cause preferences 
to become stronger. Because the probability generated in Equation 3 is dependent upon the 
absolute difference between the utilities, any manipulation that changes the size of the 
utilities involved will change the probability of choosing one option over the other. 
Specifically, multiplying both outcomes by 10, as we do in the magnitude manipulation, is 
equivalent to multiplying the difference in utilities,  𝑈𝐷 , from the baseline choice by 10
𝑎 .  
Because the probability of making a given choice increases or decreases with 𝑈𝐷 (Equation 
3), any preference shown by a participant will be exaggerated. For example, if 𝑈𝐷 > 0, then 
10𝑎 × 𝑈𝐷 > 𝑈𝐷. In essence, we would expect the strength of the participants’ preference to 
increase as the magnitude of the outcomes increases, such that choice probabilities above 0.5 
will shift towards 1 and choice probabilities below 0.5 will shift towards 0.  
In Tables 2 to 4, for simplicity, we have chosen to ignore cases in which there is no 
consistent change in the direction of preferences across either participants or items. This 
approach is equivalent to predicting the option participants would choose in each condition if 
they were indifferent between the options in the baseline condition. Note that our quantitative 
comparison does take the strengthening and weakening predictions of the models into 
account.  
Unlike PTHD, the RITCH model does predict that the magnitude manipulation will 
change the direction of participants’ preferences. RITCH predicts a similar magnitude effect 
in risky inter-temporal choices to the ITCH model, which was designed to capture magnitude 
effects in inter-temporal choice (Ericson et al., 2015). Specifically, multiplying both amounts 
by a common factor causes the absolute difference in amount between the two options to 
increase, while leaving all the other differences in attributes unchanged. Because xA ≥ 0, 
there is an overall shift in preference towards the option with the larger outcome, as X will 
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increase when x1 > x2 and decrease when x1 < x2 (Equation 20). Therefore, for all choice types 
except Delay vs. Risk, where the difference in amounts is 0 regardless of the manipulation, 
the RITCH model predicts that participants will be more likely to choose the larger amount 
option in the magnitude condition than in the baseline condition (see row 6 of Table 2). 
To demonstrate this formally, let gb1(x1, p1, t1) and gb1(x2, p2, t2), be the options 
presented to a participant in the baseline choice, where x1 < x2. From Equations 20 to 23 we 
can calculate their probability of choosing gb1 as follows: 
















Similarly, let gm1 and gm2 be the same choice presented in the magnitude condition, with both 
amounts multiplied by 10. Since time and risk are equivalent in the baseline and magnitude 
conditions, Tb = Tm and Rb = Rm. Substituting into Equation 20, however, we see that 








𝑋𝑚 =  𝛽𝑥𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) + 𝛽𝑥𝑅
(𝑥1−𝑥2)
mean (𝑥1, 𝑥2)
+ 9 ∙ 𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)  
𝑋𝑚 =  𝑋𝑏 + 9 ∙ 𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)  




  and since x1 < x2, 
9 ∙ 𝛽𝑥𝐴(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) is negative, we conclude that P(gm1 | gm1, gm2) < P(gb1 | gb1, gb2). Therefore, 
the RITCH model predicts that multiplying both outcomes by 10 leads to a higher probability 
of participants choosing the option with the higher amount, Option 2.  
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It is important to note that the RITCH model cannot produce the previously-observed 
effect of magnitude in the Delay vs. Risk choices, where participants became more likely to 
choose the delayed option when the amount of both options is increased (Baucells & 
Heukamp, 2010; Christensen et al., 1998; Luckman et al., 2017). Nor can the model produce 
a peanuts effect in Risk vs. Amount choices (Weber & Chapman, 2005b), but actually 
predicts the reverse of the peanuts effect (Chapman & Weber, 2006).   
 
Immediacy. Because PTHD builds on Hyperbolic discounting models, like those models, it 
predicts that an immediacy manipulation (i.e., increasing delays by a common duration) will 
increase preference for the later option in all choice types, regardless of the risks or amounts 
involved. This is because hyperbolic discounting functions (Equation 4) show diminishing 
sensitivity to delay. That is, a much higher discount rate per unit of time is applied to short 
time delays, than is applied to long time delays. Therefore, when both options are made more 
delayed, the relative difference in delay becomes less important. If both options have the 
same delay, as they do in Risk vs. Amount choices, the immediacy manipulation will not shift 
preferences towards one option or the other, as there is no later option to make relatively 
more favourable. These predictions are shown in the top row of Table 3.  
The RITCH model also produces immediacy effects, but rather than producing them 
through a discount function, it produces them in the same way as the ITCH model does for 
inter-temporal choice (Ericson et al., 2015). The RITCH model assumes participants consider 
both absolute differences in delay, which are not affected by adding a common delay to both 
options, and relative differences, which are. Adding a common delay causes the relative 
difference in delay, 𝛽𝑡𝑅
𝑡2−𝑡1
mean (𝑡1, 𝑡2)
, to decrease in magnitude as the numerator stays constant 
while the denominator, the maximum delay, increases by 12 months. Reducing the relative 
difference in delay while leaving all other differences unaffected, causes the support for the 
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sooner option to decrease, causing preferences to shift towards the later option. Therefore the 
RITCH model predicts the same change in preferences for the immediacy manipulations as 
the PTHD model for all choice types, albeit for a different reason (see row 6 of Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Predicted shift in preferences caused by the immediacy manipulation for each 
choice type. The predictions of each model are on a separate row. Words in bold indicate the 
attribute driving the effect. The Data row shows the observed direction in which participants’ 
preferences shifted (on the group level) in the Experiment, and whether this was significant 
according to a Logistic General Linear Mixed Effect Model explained in the results. 
Model RvA† DvA† DvR† RvAD† DvAR† DRvA† 
































































































(p = .144, 
padj = .144) 
Larger-
Later 
(p < .001, 
padj < .001) 
Safer- 
Later 
(p = .005, 





(p = .057, 




(p = .009, 





(p = .024, 
padj = .071) 
* PTT and HD predict participant’s preferences will shift towards the option with the highest 
combined risk and delay. They predict this for both the immediacy and certainty 
manipulations and, therefore, predict the same direction of shift for both manipulations. 
† R=Risk, D=Delay, A=Amount. 
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Table 4: Predicted shift in preferences caused by the certainty manipulation for each choice 
type. The predictions of each model are on a separate row. Words in bold indicate the 
attribute driving the effect. The Data row shows the observed direction in which participants’ 
preferences shifted (on the group level) in the Experiment, and whether this was significant 
according to a Logistic General Linear Mixed Effect Model explained in the results. 























































































PD No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change 
Data Larger-
Riskier 
(p < .001, 
padj < .001) 
Smaller-
Sooner 
(p = .004, 
padj = .004) 
Riskier-
Sooner 
(p < .001, 




(p < .001, 




(p < .001, 




(p < .001, 
padj < .001) 
* PTT and HD predict participant’s preferences will shift towards the option with the highest 
combined risk and delay. They predict this for both the immediacy and certainty 
manipulations and, therefore, predict the same direction of shift for both manipulations. 
† R=Risk, D=Delay, A=Amount. 
 
Certainty. Due to PTHD’s basis in Prospect Theory, the certainty manipulation (i.e., reducing 
the probabilities by a common ratio) will increase preferences for the riskier option in all 
choice types. This increase occurs because the probability weighting function (Equation 2) is 
s-shaped, overweighting small probabilities, making the low probability of the riskier option 
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relatively more favourable in the certainty manipulation, and underweights moderate to large 
probabilities, making the riskier option relatively less favourable when the probabilities are 
larger. Of course, this prediction does not hold for choices where there is no riskier option – 
i.e., the Delay vs. Amount choices (see top row of Table 4). 
The RITCH model also predicts the certainty manipulation will increase preferences 
for the riskier option in all choice types. Dividing all probabilities by 5 has no effect on the 
relative difference in probabilities between the options, 𝛽𝑝𝑅 ×
𝑝1−𝑝2
mean (𝑝1, 𝑝2)
, since both the 
numerator and denominator are divided by 5, but does decrease the magnitude of absolute 
difference in probabilities, 𝛽𝑝𝐴(𝑝1 − 𝑝2). Reducing the absolute difference in probabilities 
while leaving all other differences unchanged makes the higher probability option less 
attractive, leading to a shift towards preferring the riskier option. Since the absolute 
difference in probabilities is 0 in Delay vs. Amount choices, RITCH predicts no change in 
preferences for this choice type (see row 6 of Table 4). 
 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred first year psychology students from the University of New South 
Wales participated for course credit. All choices were hypothetical. The sample size, based 
on sample sizes used in model comparison studies in risky choice (Rieskamp, 2008; Stott, 
2006), was decided prior to data collection.  
 
Materials. We created 16 different instances of each of the 6 types of risky inter-temporal 
choice. This total of 96 choices form the baseline set (see Table A3 in Appendix B for the 
amounts, delays and probabilities used in all baseline choices). Where possible, these choices 
were taken directly from those used in Luckman et al. (2018) or in a pilot study completed by 
the participants in their experiment. In order to create enough choices of each type, some of 
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the choices from Luckman et al. (2018), or the pilot, were modified by adding a random 
small delay or risk. The delays in the baseline set ranged from 0 to 54 months, the 
probabilities from 0.05 to 1 and the amounts from $50 to $475.10 
The 96 baseline choices were modified three times to create three additional choice 
sets, each matching one of the three key manipulations. The 96 immediacy choices were 
identical to the baseline set, but with an extra 12 months added to the delays of both options. 
Similarly, the certainty set had the probabilities divided by 5, and the magnitude set had the 
outcome amounts multiplied by 10. 
In addition to the 384 choices of interest, we also included 6 choices where one option 
was dominated. In these dominated choices, one option was better than the other on at least 
one attribute, and matched on the remaining attributes. These choices were included as check 
questions, such that we excluded from further analysis any participants who chose the 
dominated option on more than one of these choices. 
 
Procedure. Participants were told that they would be making choices that involved a mixture 
of risks and delays. Each choice would be between two options, and there were no correct 
answers, rather we were interested in their preferences. They were also told to consider each 
choice independently, and that all choices were hypothetical. There was no time limit. 
For each choice, participants were given both a written statement of the two options, 
and a summary of the relevant amounts, delays and probabilities of each option (see 
Appendix B). In addition to instructing participants to take their time and have breaks if 
necessary, the task was also divided into three sections of 130 choices each to allow breaks. 
 
10 To ensure that we had some choices very similar to standard risky and standard inter-temporal choices, 8 of 
the 16 Risk vs. Amount choices had a delay of 0 for both options, and 8 of the 16 Delay vs. Amount choices had 
a probability of 1 for both options. Furthermore, because many studies of risky inter-temporal choice have 
focused on circumstances where at least one option contains a certain or immediate outcome, for the other 4 
choice types half of the baseline choices had a sooner option with a delay of 0 and a safer option with a 
probability of 1. 
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The order of the 390 choices was randomized for all participants. A warning to consider their 




Exclusions. Thirty-two participants chose at least one dominated option throughout the 
experiment. In line with our pre-set exclusion criteria, ten of these participants were excluded 
as they chose two or more dominated options leaving 90 participants in our analysis. 
 
Group data. Figure 1 shows the proportion of participants choosing each option in the four 
choice sets (Baseline, Magnitude, Immediacy, Certainty). Each dot represents a single choice, 
while the crosses show the mean proportions for each of the 6 choice types (Risk vs. Amount 
(RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), 
Delay vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & Risk vs. Amount (DRvA)). (The choice 
proportions are also reported in Table A3 in Appendix B). Each panel of Figure 1 shows the 
responses for one of the six choice types. The y-axis label in each panel indicates whether 
larger proportions reflect a preference for the Smaller or Larger amount, Safer or Riskier 
probability and Sooner or Later delay for that choice type. If an attribute has the same value 
for both options a descriptor is not given for that attribute. For instance, for the Risk vs. 
Amount (RvA) choices in the top left panel we plot the proportion of participants choosing 
the Smaller Safer option, as both options have the same delay. Each panel is further broken 
into three segments, one for each of the three manipulations: magnitude, immediacy and 
certainty. To highlight the effects of each manipulation, each segment plots both the choice 
proportion for the effect of interest (the coloured points) and the choice proportion in the 
baseline condition (black points). Finally, as there is no a priori order of choices within each 
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choice type, to improve clarity we have ordered choices along the x-axis, within each choice 
type, so that choice proportion in the baseline condition increases.  
To provide a rather crude test of the predictions in Tables 2-4, for each manipulation 
and choice type we fit a Logistic General Linear Mixed-Effect Model to the baseline and 
particular manipulation data. The dependent variable was whether participants chose the 
option indicated in the y-axis label in Figure 1 for each of the six choice types. The predictor 
was whether the trial came from the baseline or manipulation condition (the fixed effect), 
with random intercepts for participants and items/choices. That is, we allowed different 
participants to have different choice proportions, and different specific choice pairs to have 
different choice proportions. P-values were calculated using the Likelihood Ratio Test 
method of the afex package in R (Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, Aust, & Ben-Shachar, 2019) 
and adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). 11 
Because we required a separate Logistic GLMM for each choice type and manipulation, 18 
separate tests were run. The last row in each Table (2-4) shows the direction of the effect of 
the manipulation, and p-value obtained from these tests.  
  
 
11 Using an alpha level of 0.05, the same results are obtained if we calculate for each choice type the proportion 
of times each participant chose option 1 in each condition and compare each manipulation to the baseline using 




Figure 1: Proportion of participants choosing option 1 for each choice. Choices are grouped into 
panels according to the choice type; Risk vs. Amount (RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. 
Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), Delay vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & 
Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). Black triangles are the baseline condition and are the same across all three 
segments of each panel. Red dots show the magnitude condition (left segment), yellow the immediacy 
(middle segment) and blue the certainty (right segment) for each choice type. Crosses are the mean for 
each choice type for each condition. 
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Group-level magnitude effects In the magnitude condition (left segment of each panel 
in Figure 1) there is a greater preference for selecting the later (delayed) option, relative to 
the baseline condition, for the Delay vs. Amount, Delay vs. Amount & Risk, Delay vs. Risk 
(red points below black points in the middle and bottom left panels) and Risk vs. Amount & 
Delay (red points above black points in the top right panel) choice types. There is no 
significant change in preferences, relative to the baseline condition, for the Risk vs. Amount 
or Delay & Risk vs. Amount choices (red and black dots overlap in top left and bottom right 
panels). Overall, with the exception of the Delay & Risk vs. Amount choices, this pattern is 
very close to what we would expect if the magnitude effect was caused by participants 
becoming willing to wait longer when the magnitude of the outcomes increases. If the 
magnitude effect was instead driven by participants choosing the larger option, as predicted 
by pure attribute-comparison models, then we would have expected no change in preference 
for the Delay vs. Risk choices, a reversed change in the Risk vs. Amount & Delay choices 
and a change towards the larger riskier option in the Risk vs. Amount choices.  
Qualitatively, the pattern we observe is closest to the PTT and Trade-off predictions 
(see Table 2), although no model perfectly predicts all the data patterns. In particular the 
PTT, MHD, Trade-off, and RITCH models all predict preference changes in both the Risk vs. 
Amount choices and the Delay & Risk vs. Amount choices, which we do not observe. 
Conversely the predictions of the PTHD, HD and PD models, which do not predict 
magnitude effects, are correct for these two choice types, but incorrect for the other four 
choice types where preference changes do occur. It should be noted that the Risk vs. Amount 
(top left) choices are very similar, or sometimes identical to, pure risky choices, so the lack of 
difference between the magnitude (red points) and baseline (black points) could be 
considered a failure to replicate the usual peanuts effect.  
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Group-level immediacy and certainty effects In the immediacy manipulation (middle 
segment), choices appear to shift towards the later option for all choices types, except Risk 
vs. Amount (top left panel) where this cannot occur. However, this shift is not significant for 
the Risk vs. Amount & Delay (top right panel) or Delay & Risk vs. Amount (bottom right 
panel) choices. This pattern is consistent with the immediacy effect in inter-temporal choice, 
and is, for the most part, qualitatively consistent with the predictions of the PTHD, MHD, 
Trade-off, PD and RITCH models in Table 3.  
The certainty manipulation (right segment) seems to shift preferences towards the 
riskier options, consistent with the certainty effect in risky choice. This result also mostly 
qualitatively matches the predictions of the PTHD, MHD, RITCH and Trade-off models, as 
shown in Table 4. However, we also see a moderate shift towards the sooner option in the 
Delay vs. Amount choice (blue points higher than black points, middle left panel), which is 
only predicted by the Trade-off model. Both PTT and HD, due to the translation process they 
assume, predict that the certainty and immediacy manipulations should cause preferences to 
shift in the same direction for all 6 choice types (Table 3 & 4, rows 3 and 4). However 
focusing on the three choice types where Risk and Delay are traded off against each other 
(bottom left, top right, and middle right panels) we instead see that the immediacy (yellow 
points) and certainty (blue points) preferences shift in opposite directions relative to the 
baseline (black points). In the certainty condition they shift towards the riskier option, while 
in the immediacy condition they shift towards the later option, or not at all. 
In summary, the magnitude manipulation seemed to shift participants’ preferences 
towards the later option, except when the later option was riskier. Similarly, the immediacy 
manipulation shifted preferences towards the later option, although not significantly for all 
choice types. The certainty manipulation, in contrast, shifted preferences towards the riskier 
option, except when there was no riskier option, in which case the sooner option became 
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more preferred. These results do not perfectly match the predictions of any one model, 
although the Trade-off models’ predictions are qualitatively the best across all three 
manipulations (see Tables 2,3 & 4 and associated explanation in the Supplementary 
Materials). The immediacy and certainty manipulation results also seem to best match the 
predictions of the non-translation models (excluding the PD model which does not predict 
certainty effects), rather than the two translation models, PTT and HD. However, predicting 
the correct direction of the effect does not necessarily mean that the model is predicting the 
correct change in behaviour. For this reason, the next section will focus on the models’ 
quantitative predictions. 
 
Model Comparison  
Fitting Procedure. In order to test the models’ ability to predict the effects of each of the 
three critical manipulations, we need to know which parameter values are most appropriate 
for each model. In standard Bayesian model selection using Bayes factors, the predictions of 
the models come from the joint specification of the likelihood function for the model and the 
prior distributions placed on parameters. In our situation, however, our knowledge of each of 
the models differs tremendously, making it unclear how best to define prior distributions for 
some of the models. For example, some of the models have never been fit to risky inter-
temporal data, making it difficult to know which parameter values are likely to provide 
reasonable predictions for participants’ choices. Our solution to this problem is to use the 
choices in the baseline condition to obtain posterior distributions for the parameters of all 
models. We then use these posterior distributions as prior distributions for their respective 
models to generate predictions for each of the three manipulation datasets. 
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Prediction as a natural penalty for model complexity We chose to use this Bayesian 
method of model comparison because Bayes factors, by their very nature, include a penalty 
for model complexity. As we will describe in detail shortly, Bayes factors are based on how 
well the model fits the data across their whole parameter space, weighted by the priors placed 
on those parameters. So, unlike methods that take into account only the best-fitting 
combination of parameter values, Bayes factors have a built-in penalty for more complex 
models. Therefore, a complex model that fits the data very well for one particular subset of 
parameter combinations, but poorly for many other combinations (permitted by the priors) 
will perform worse than a simpler model that fits moderately well for all its possible 
parameter combinations.  
Our approach should provide a balanced approach to the issue of the different 
parametric complexity of our set of models. For instance, consider a relatively flexible model 
that captures the observed baseline behaviour with a very limited set of parameter values. 
Such a model will have its parameter space restricted by the resultant prior distribution used 
to predict data in the manipulation conditions. If behaviour in the manipulation choice sets 
are then consistent with the model’s predictions based on baseline behaviour, then this model 
will perform well, despite the fact that it could have predicted other patterns with other 
parameter values if the baseline behaviour was different. Conversely, if the manipulation 
behaviour is inconsistent with the baseline behaviour, but is consistent with other possible 
parameterisations of the model, this model will perform poorly, as the prior distributions will 
neglect these other parts of the model’s parameter space.  
 
Estimating parameters for Baseline behaviour We fit hierarchical versions of each 
of the models to the baseline data. Hierarchical models represent a compromise between the 
independent estimation of parameters for each individual, and pooling the data from all 
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individuals to obtain a single parametrization of each model. In hierarchical modelling, while 
individual parameter values are estimated for each participant, these individual-level 
parameters are assumed to be drawn from a group-level distribution. Hierarchical models 
allow individual differences to be captured, while also using the group performance to 
constrain individual estimates (see Nilsson, Rieskamp and Wagenmakers 2011). At the 
individual level, model fit is given by the likelihood of the observed response for each of the 
96 choices, such that no aggregation was done at the level of choice type. 
For all parameters in all models, the individual-level parameters were assumed to be 
drawn from Normal distributions, N(μ, σ), where μ and σ were group-level parameters – 
hyperparameters – which are also estimated from the data. Depending upon the particular 
parameter, these normal distributions were truncated to match the restrictions placed on the 
values particular parameters could take.12 Table A1 in Appendix A presents the distributions 
used for each parameter for each model in the current analysis.   
The parameters for all models were estimated using Bayesian methods (in JAGS; 
Plummer, 2003). Rather than estimating a single best value for each parameter, Bayesian 
parameter estimation results in a posterior distribution of values for each parameter. To create 
these posterior distributions for each model we ran 4 chains of 200,000 iterations each, saving 
every fourth iteration of each chain. Bayesian parameter estimation requires that we set a 
prior distribution for each of our hyper-parameters. When estimating parameters for the 
baseline condition, because we were only interested in parameter estimation, we used vague, 
broad uniform prior distributions for all hyper-parameters. Table A1 lists the priors for the 
 
12 A version was also run using more complex assumptions about the distributions from which parameters were 
drawn. Discount rate parameters are commonly found to be positively skewed (Myerson, Green & 
Warusawitharana, 2001), with logarithmic transformations often proposed (Kim & Zauberman, 2009), for this 
reason all discount rate parameters (hPTHD, hrMHD, hdMHD, hHD, iPTHD) were lognormally, rather than normally, 
distributed. We also followed the method employed by Nilsson, Rieskamp and Wagenmakers (2011) for dealing 
with parameters which are constrained to be between zero and one (rPTHD, γPTT). This involves transforming 
these parameters to the probit scale before assuming they are drawn from unconstrained normal distributions. 
The results from these versions were similar to the results we report here. 
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hyper-parameters. For bounded parameters we placed a uniform prior on 𝜇 equal to the 
possible range of values. For exponent parameters a (Equation 1), sd (Equation 6), sr and c 
(Equation 7), we placed a uniform prior on  of U(0, 10), as in all cases we expected the 
mean value to be below 1, but wanted to allow the possibility of increasing sensitivity. For all 
other  parameters we based the prior roughly on the literature, by allowing for values from 
the minimum allowed, usually 0, up to approximately 100 times those reported previously in 
the literature (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Ericson et al., 2015; Luckman et al., 2018; 
Myerson et al., 2011; Scholten, Read & Sanborn, 2014; Vanderveldt et al., 2015). The prior 
on all σ parameters was always set from 0 to the width of the prior on the corresponding  
parameter.   
Once the posterior distributions for all parameters were estimated from the baseline 
data, they were then used to test the predictions of each model for behaviour in the 
manipulation datasets. In short, the posteriors from the baseline set were used as prior 
distributions on parameters in the manipulation data sets. As such, each model generates a 
full distribution of predicted choices for each of the three data sets. To compare the overall 
predictive accuracy of the models, we use the marginal likelihood of each model, in each of 
the three manipulation data sets. The marginal likelihood is the probability of the data, 
integrating over the prior probability of all possible parametrizations of the model. The 
marginal likelihood is then used to calculate Bayes factors comparing particular pairs of 
models. 
 
Estimating marginal likelihoods for manipulation conditions There are many 
methods for calculating the marginal likelihood of a model, the method we employed is 
similar to the sampling method outlined in Vandekerckhove, Matzke and Wagenmakers 
(2015). In this method, values for each parameter for each individual are randomly sampled 
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from the appropriate prior distribution (here, the posterior distributions estimated from the 
baseline data), and the likelihood is calculated for each parameter set. Note that although the 
parameters used for the three manipulation data sets are the same as those estimated from the 
baseline data, the data used to evaluate the likelihood of those parameters come from the 
manipulation data sets. That is, our process tests how well the parameters estimated for the 
baseline set can predict the data observed in the three manipulation sets.  
 Once sufficiently many samples are drawn, we average the entire set of likelihoods 
over parameter values, which yields the marginal likelihood of the model. Here, we sampled 
parameter sets directly, and exhaustively, from the posterior distributions obtained for the 
baseline data set, thus preserving the covariance between parameters, and the hierarchical 
structure of our models. This means that each marginal likelihood is based on 200,000 
samples (i.e. the number of iterations conducted to build the posterior distributions of each 
parameter).13 Each sampled parameter set consisted of a sample of participant level parameter 
values for each individual participant. Repeating this sampling procedure separately for each 
of the three manipulations, resulted in three separate marginal likelihoods for each model. 
As well as calculating the likelihood for each sample parameter set, we also calculated 
prior predictives for each model in each manipulation data set. The prior predictives are 
simply the predicted distribution of choices generated from each parameter set. Practically, 
creating prior predictives involved simulating the behaviour of each individual for each 
choice, given the parameters sampled for that particular individual. We also obtained 
posterior predictives for the baseline dataset using the same method.  
 
13 One risk with sampling directly from the prior is that there may be sets of parameter values which greatly 
affect the marginal likelihood, because they provide a good fit to the data, but are unlikely to be sampled, as 
they are unlikely under the prior. This can result in an unreliable estimate of the marginal likelihood, as the 
estimate will vary substantially depending upon whether this unlikely parameter set was included in the sample 
or not. This risk becomes worse the fewer samples you take from the prior, as the chance of these sets being 
excluded increases. In the supplemental materials we include the results from several analyses we performed to 
check if this may be an issue/if our number of samples from the prior was sufficient for reliable estimates. We 
also conducted a limited model recovery study for three of the models, PTT, RITCH and MHD to test our 
method further. 
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Figure 2: Observed and predicted proportion of participants choosing option 1 for each choice in the 
baseline condition. Choices are grouped into panels according to the choice type; Risk vs. Amount 
(RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), Delay 
vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). Each panel is divided into 7 
segments. Each segment shows the actual data for that choice type (black points) against the predicted 
proportions from one of the models (grey crosses and lines). The crosses are the median predicted 
proportions from the model, while the lines are 1 and 99 quantiles. The order of segments/model 
predictions is; Prospect Theory with Hyperbolic Discounting (PTHD), Multiplicative Hyperboloid 
Discounting (MHD), Hyperbolic Discounting (HD), Probability and Time Trade-off (PTT), Trade-off 
(TO), the Risky Inter-Temporal Choice Heuristic (RITCH) and Proportional Difference (PD). 
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Baseline. Figure 2 shows the posterior predictives of each model for the baseline data. As 
with Figure 1 each choice type is plotted in a separate panel, and each panel is divided into 
multiple segments. Each segment in Figure 2 shows both the observed choice proportion for 
each choice, given by the black points, and the predictions for one of the 7 models, given by 
the grey crosses and lines (see the y-axis label for a definition of choice proportion for each 
choice type). The black points match the triangles shown in Figure 1. As the models were 
directly fit to this data, the predictions here are posterior predictives; that is, they are 
predictions based on the posterior distributions of parameters after they have been fit to these 
data. The crosses show the median prediction from each model, while the lines give the range 
from .01 to 0.99 quantile. As expected, given that the models were fit to this dataset, all 
models appear to capture the observed behaviour in the baseline dataset. 
 
Magnitude effect. Figure 3 gives a visual impression of how well each model captures the 
data from the magnitude manipulation condition. Similar to Figure 2, the black points are the 
choice proportions for the given choice type in the magnitude condition, while the grey lines 
and crosses in each segment are the choice proportions predicted by a specific model. Unlike 
the grey in Figure 2, we now plot prior predictives; that is, we plot the predictions of each 
model based on the parameter settings estimated from the baseline dataset. To be clear, we 
now plot pure predictions from each model - the parameters of each model were not 
estimated based on the choices participants made in the magnitude condition. 
In order to compare the performance of the models we calculated Bayes factors from 
the marginal likelihoods of each model. Bayes factors are the ratio of the marginal 
likelihoods for two models, and so display how much more likely the observed responses are 
under one model than the other. For instance, a Bayes factor of 2 indicates that the observed 
responses are twice as likely under one model than another. We calculated Bayes factors 
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comparing each model to the PTHD model. Table 5 shows the natural log of these Bayes 
factors (lnBF). As we have taken the log, positive values indicate that the listed model 
performed better than the PTHD model, while negative values indicate that it performed 
worse than the PTHD model. Because the same reference model, PTHD, has been used for 
calculating all Bayes factors you can calculate the lnBF comparing any other two models 
(e.g. RITCH and MHD), by taking the difference of the lnBFs reported in the table. For 
instance, the lnBF comparing the RITCH model to the MHD model for the magnitude 
manipulation is 227, meaning that the evidence is stronger for the RITCH model than the 
MHD model. Further, because of the common reference model, the model with the highest 
lnBF in any column is the model with the best predictions, and the model with the lowest 
lnBF gave the worst predictions. If we chose a different model to act as the comparison 
model the ordering of models would be preserved. 
In addition to calculating BFs comparing each model to the PTHD model, we also 
calculated two BFs comparing classes of model. Row 8 of Table 5 shows the lnBFs for each 
condition comparing the class of Attribute-comparison models (RITCH and PD) to the class 
of Utility-comparison models (PTHD, MHD, HD, PTT). We exclude the Trade-off model 
from either grouping, as it uses a mixture of attribute-comparisons and utility calculations. 
Positive values indicate stronger evidence for an attribute-comparison process while negative 
values indicate evidence for utility-comparison process. Row 9 similarly shows the lnBFs 
comparing the class of non-translation utility-comparison models (PTHD and MHD) to the 
class of utility-comparison models with a translation of risk into delay (HD and PTT). As this 
comparison focuses on the presence or absence of a translation process within a utility model, 
the three attribute-comparison models are excluded. Negative values indicate support for the 
translation of risks into delays. For these two rows of BFs we assumed equal priors for each 
class of models, and calculated the marginal likelihood by averaging the marginal likelihood 
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for all models in a class. These BFs cannot be compared to each other, or to the BFs for 
individual models. 
 
Table 5: Logarithm of the Bayes factor for each model compared to the PTHD model. Higher 
values indicate better performance, with positive values indicating the model performed 
better than PTHD and negative values indicating it performed worse. PTHD has a lnBF of 0, 
as comparing a model to itself results in a BF of 1. The best-performing model in each 
condition is bolded. We assume an equal prior probability for all models in these 
calculations. The final 2 rows show lnBFs comparing classes of models. Row 8 shows the 
lnBF comparing the attribute class of models (RITCH and PD) to the utility class (PTHD, 
MHD, HD and PTT), while row 9 shows the lnBF comparing the non-translation Utility 
models (PTHD and MHD) to the translation utility class (HD and PTT). For these 
calculations we assume equal prior probabilities for each model within a class, and equal 
priors for each class. 
Model All Conditions Magnitude Immediacy Certainty 
PTHD 0 0 0 0 
MHD 1198 923 48 200  
HD 242 521 -103 -199  
PTT -396 -159 -207 -73  
Trade-off 160 527 -30 -358  
RITCH 1646 1148 145 321  
PD 1148 1134 64 -148 
Attribute vs. Utility 449 226 97 122 
Non-Tr. Utility vs. 
Translation Utility 
956 403 151 273 
 
Column two of Table 5 shows the performance of the seven models in the magnitude 
data. Overall, the RITCH model performs best with the MHD, PD, Trade-off and HD models 
also performing better than the PTHD model (i.e. they have positive ln BF). Two of the three 
best performing models, RITCH and MHD (excluding PD), predict that the magnitude will 
have a directional effect on at least some choice types. However, as shown in Table 2, they 
do not predict the same effects in all choice types. This difference of prediction is also seen in 
Figure 3, where one model tends to visually perform worse than the other for certain choice 
types. For instance, in the Delay vs. Amount choices (middle left panel) RITCH appears to 
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perform much better than MHD, as it correctly predicts that participants’ preferences will 
shift towards the more delayed option. In contrast, RITCH does not perform as well as the 
MHD model in the Risk vs. Amount & Delay choices (top right panel). Here, RITCH predicts 
a shift towards the larger option, while MHD (qualitatively, but not necessarily 
quantitatively) predicts the observed shift towards the smaller safer later option.  
The width of the predictions of the models should also be noted. While the median 
predicted proportions generated by the MHD model in the Risk vs. Amount & Delay choices 
is much closer to the observed proportions than the median proportions generated by the 
RITCH model, MHD also makes a much more limited range of predictions. Because RITCH 
predicts a much larger range of proportions, the RITCH model will not be penalised as 
heavily for incorrect predictions. This highlights the importance of considering the 
quantitative, not just qualitative predictions of the model. It should also be noted that Figure 3 
displays the group level predictions of each model, while the marginal likelihoods, and 
therefore Bayes factors, are based on each model’s ability to predict individual data points. 
Therefore, while Figure 3 provides a reasonable visualization of the models’ performances, it 
does not precisely reflect the Bayes factors. 
The PTT and Trade-off models also predict magnitude effects, although they perform 
worse than MHD and RITCH. This is despite them making the correct qualitative prediction 
for the majority of choices (see Table 2). In the case of PTT, it also performs worse than both 
PTHD and HD, which do not predict magnitude effects (see Table 2).  This poor performance 
suggests that the way PTT captures magnitude effects is flawed, as it appears to predict too 
large an effect in some choice types (e.g. bottom left and top right panels) and too small an 
effect for other choice types (middle left). The Trade-off model shows a similar misfit, 
though to a lesser extent. The HD model also performs better than the PTHD model, despite 
the two models making qualitatively similar predictions regarding magnitude effects. 
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Figure 3: Observed and predicted proportion of participants choosing option 1 for each choice in the 
magnitude condition. Choices are grouped into panels according to the choice type; Risk vs. Amount 
(RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), Delay 
vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). Each panel is divided into 7 
segments. Each segment shows the actual data for that choice type (black points) against the predicted 
proportions from one of the models (grey crosses and lines). The crosses are the median predicted 
proportions from the model, while the lines are 1 and 99 quantiles. The order of choices within each 
segment matches Figure 1. The order of models on the x-axis matches Figure 2.  
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Comparing the performance of the RITCH and PD models is also informative, as PD 
is very similar to RITCH except without the absolute comparisons, and using the maximum 
value as the reference point. These are the two best performing models, despite making 
qualitatively different predictions, with RITCH predicting magnitude effects, due to the 
consideration of absolute differences in outcomes, while PD does not. The good performance 
of both models is also reflected in the positive lnBF comparing the classes of attribute- and 
utility-comparison models (Column 2, Row 8). The strong performance of the PD model 
could partly be due to those choice types in which RITCH incorrectly predicts the magnitude 
effect, such as the Risk vs. Amount or Risk vs. Amount & Delay choices (top panels). 
However, both HD and PTHD models make the same qualitative predictions as the PD model 
for all choice types (see Table 2), and neither of these utility-based models performs well. 
The poor performance of the HD and PTHD models, relative to PD, may indicate an overall 
advantage for the attribute-based comparison process over a utility-based process. 
Alternatively, the PD model may be performing so well, despite failing to predict magnitude 
effects, because the data is better captured by using the maximum as a reference point as 
opposed to the mean. 
Individual Fits As the models were fit hierarchically, in addition to comparing the 
models at the group level, we can also compare the performance of the models for each 
individual by calculating the marginal likelihood, and therefore BFs, for each participant for 
each model. In Table 6 we report the number of participants for which each model had the 
highest BF. For the magnitude manipulation, the individual level results broadly match the 
group level BFs, with the majority of participants best fit by one of the RITCH, PD or MHD 




Table 6: Number of participants (out of 90) best fit by each model according to individual 
level BFs. The best-performing model in each condition is bolded. The second last row shows 
the number of participants who are best fit by the attribute model over the utility model, if we 
consider the 2 attribute models (RITCH and PD) a single model with equal prior and the 4 
utility models a single model with equal prior. The last row shows the number of participants 
(out of 90) best fit by a combined non-translation utility model compared to a combined 
translation utility model. 
Model All Conditions Magnitude Immediacy Certainty 
PTHD 1 5 8 4 
MHD 19 16 8 19 
HD 1 7 8 3 
PTT 2 8 8 1 
Trade-off 12 11 9 7 
RITCH 38 19 29 41 
PD 17 24 20 15 
Attribute vs. 
Utility 
63 54 59 62 
Non-Tr. Utility vs. 
Translation Utility 
82 62 64 73 
 
Immediacy effect. Figure 4 shows the prior predictives for the immediacy manipulation 
choices. Similar to the magnitude effect, the RITCH, MHD and PD models perform better 
than PTHD, while PTT performs worse. Unlike the magnitude manipulation, PTHD 
outperforms the HD and the Trade-off model in the immediacy manipulation. Looking at 
column three of Table 5, there appears to be a relatively clear divide between the five models 
which predict that the immediacy manipulation affects the inter-temporal component of the 
choice – RITCH, MHD, PTHD, PD and Trade-off (see Table 3), and the translation models, 
which predict the immediacy manipulation also affects the risky component of the choice. 
This pattern is also present in individual level fits in Table 6, with only 16 out of 90 
participants best fit by the translation models. If we look at the class level lnBF comparing 
the two types of utility models the evidence also favours no translation of risks into delays 
(Table 5: Column 3, Row 9). 
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Figure 4: Observed and predicted proportion of participants choosing option 1 for each choice in the 
immediacy condition. Choices are grouped into panels according to the choice type; Risk vs. Amount 
(RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), Delay 
vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). Each panel is divided into 7 
segments. Each segment shows the actual data for that choice type (black points) against the predicted 
proportions from one of the models (grey crosses and lines). The crosses are the median predicted 
proportions from the model, while the lines are 1 and 99 quantiles. The order of choices within each 
segment matches Figure 1. The order of models on the x-axis matches Figure 2.  
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As with the magnitude condition, if we compare the attribute- and utility-comparison 
model classes we find support for the attribute-comparison process (Table 5: Column 3, Row 
8). At the level of individual fits the two attribute models also account for 49 participants 
between them. Comparing the RITCH model and PD model suggests that the former model, 
which uses both relative and absolute differences in attribute levels, is necessary, at least for 
many participants. At the group level, the RITCH model performs much better than PD, 
despite both qualitatively predicting the same effects, suggesting that incorporating absolute 
differences into a model’s behavior may be necessary to temper the effects predicted by the 
relative changes in attribute values. However, it may not be that all participants consider 
absolute values, as the PD model does the second-best job of predicting individual 
participant’s choices.  
 
Certainty effect. The results of the certainty choices are similar to the immediacy choices. As 
with the immediacy choices the MHD and RITCH models outperform PTHD, while the 
Trade-off, PTT and HD models are outperformed by PTHD (see Figure 5 and Column 4 of 
Table 5). However, unlike for the immediacy manipulation, the PD model is outperformed by 
PTHD. It should be noted that the PD model is the only model that does not predict any 
certainty effects. Of the models that do predict certainty effects, the models that locate the 
effect in the risky component of choice (MHD, RITCH and PTHD; see Table 4), outperform 
the two translation models – PTT and HD, which assume certainty also affects the inter-
temporal component. Isolating the effect of certainty to risk also gives rise to the superior 
performance of non-translation over translation models at a class level (Table 5: Column 4, 
Row 9). The Trade-off model, which performs the worst, also assumes the certainty 
manipulation affects inter-temporal preferences, albeit as a consistent preference for the 
sooner option. 
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Figure 5: Observed and predicted proportion of participants choosing option 1 for each choice in the 
certainty condition. Choices are grouped into panels according to the choice type; Risk vs. Amount 
(RvA), Delay vs. Amount (DvA), Delay vs. Risk (DvR), Risk vs. Amount & Delay (RvAD), Delay 
vs. Amount & Risk (DvAR), and Delay & Risk vs. Amount (DRvA). Each panel is divided into 7 
segments. Each segment shows the actual data for that choice type (black points) against the predicted 
proportions from one of the models (grey crosses and lines). The crosses are the median predicted 
proportions from the model, while the lines are 1 and 99 quantiles. The order of choices within each 




The individual-level results are again broadly consistent with the group level (see 
Table 6 column 4). RITCH is best fitting for almost half of participants, with the MHD model 
accounting for the next highest number of participants. Unlike the group level results, the PD 
model accounts for the third largest number of participants, perhaps suggesting that there is a 
small subset of participants who do not show a certainty effect. 
 
Overall. One issue with comparing model performance on each manipulation separately is 
that a model may perform well for each effect, but poorly for all three at once. Column one of 
Tables 5 and 6 shows the model comparison results when BFs are calculated based on the fits 
to all three manipulation datasets at once. The RITCH model has the highest lnBF at the 
group level, and best predicts data for the largest number of participants, with the MHD and 
PD models being the next best performing. The class-level lnBFs are also consistent with the 
separate results from the 3 manipulations, with attribute-comparisons favoured over utility 
models, and models assuming no translation of risk and delay being supported over models 
with a translation. 
 
Parameter Estimates. Table 7 shows the posterior parameter estimates for the group-level 𝜇 
values for each of the parameters of each model obtained from the fits to the baseline data (an 
equivalent table for 𝜎 can be found in the supplementary materials). For each 𝜇 parameter we 
report the median and the central 95% credible interval of the posterior distribution for that 
parameter. Table 7 thus shows what values we believe the mean of each parameter to be, 
having now seen the baseline data. In the table the parameters for each model are on a 
separate row, but we group together parameters from similar functions (e.g. value functions, 
discounting functions, etc.) into columns. These estimates reveal several important insights. 
Firstly, focusing on the models that use a power value function- PTHD, HD and MHD- we 
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can see in the Value column that 𝜇𝑎 is less than 1, resulting in a concave value function at the 
group level. The concavity of the value functions indicates that, at the group level, the 
participants show diminishing sensitivity to amounts, (e.g., they are more sensitive to the 
difference between $1 and $2 than between $101 and $102). Diminishing sensitivity to 
amount is consistent with prior research into risky choice (Stott, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1992), although not necessarily inter-temporal choice (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, l’Haridon & 
Paraschiv, 2013). In pure risky-choice situations, this pattern is often characterized as risk 
aversion. The value functions used by the other models-- PTT and Trade-off-- explicitly 
assume diminishing sensitivity to amount, so it is reassuring that this assumption is supported 
by those models that have the flexibility to refute it. 
Looking further at Table 7 we can also compare the probability-weighting function 
parameters to those commonly reported in the literature. For models with a one-parameter 
probability weighting function (PTHD, PTT, Trade-off), we see that the 𝜇𝛾/𝑟 parameters are 
generally estimated to be close to 1, suggesting that at the group level, participants use almost 
linear/objective weighting of probabilities. Based on the literature, we might expect larger 
deviations from linear weighting due to participants overweighting small probabilities and 
underweighting moderate ones (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992; Nilsson et al., 2011), however, 
such small departures are not unprecedented (Luckman, Donkin & Newell, 2018; Stott, 
2006). 
Turning to attribute-based models, we now focus on the group-level parameter 
estimates from the best-fitting model, the RITCH model. Focusing on the bias parameters – 
𝜇𝛽𝑥𝑂, 𝜇𝛽𝑝𝑂, and 𝜇𝛽𝑡𝑂 – we see more relative bias, independent of the magnitude of attribute 
differences, to prefer either the larger or safer option, than the sooner option. This result is 
similar to the equivalent parameters in the PD model although the estimates for that model 
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suggest that the bias towards the safer option may be stronger than that towards the larger 
option.  
 
Table 7: Posterior distributions for group level (µ) parameters for each model. Median and 
95% equal-tailed Credible Interval reported for each parameter of each model. Parameters 
for the utility and trade-off model are grouped according to the type of function (e.g. value 
function) they are associated with. For attribute models they are grouped according to the 
type of difference (bias, relative, absolute) they are weighting. 
Model µ values (median [95% CI]) 
 Value Probability Weighting Discounting Choice 




 0.97  
[0.88 - 
1.00] 
  0.0018  
[7e-05 - 
0.0086] 
  0.20  
[0.008 - 
0.87] 



















  7.57  
[4.85 - 
12.47] 




 21.60  
[0.88 - 
79.62] 
  0.0035  
[0.0001 - 
0.0120] 
  0.42  
[0.02 - 
1.52] 










  0.28  
[0.01 - 
1.33] 
  0.29  
[0.02 - 
0.61] 
 Value Prob. Weighting Time Weighting Choice 
Trade-
off 




 0.97  
[0.90 - 
1.00] 
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Staying with the attribute-based models, if we turn to the weights given to relative 
differences in each of the attributes - 𝜇𝛽𝑥𝑅, 𝜇𝛽𝑝𝑅, and 𝜇𝛽𝑡𝑅 - we see that greater weight is 
given to relative differences in amount (median = 1.42), compared to relative differences in 
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probability (median = 0.61), and that the least weight is given to relative differences in delay 
(median = 0.045). On its own, this pattern might suggest that differences in outcome amount 
are considered the most important when making decisions, and differences in delay the least 
important. However, an interpretation focusing only on the relative differences ignores the 
absolute differences in each attribute level in the RITCH model. If we look at the absolute-
difference weighting parameters - 𝜇𝛽𝑥𝐴, 𝜇𝛽𝑝𝐴, and 𝜇𝛽𝑡𝐴 - we see that a 1 month difference in 
delay is given more weight (median = 0.012) than a 1% difference in probability (median = 
0.0063), which in turn is given more weight than a $1 difference in amount (median = 
0.00021). It is worth noting that these parameters should not be interpreted as a measure of 
the importance given to each attribute, because the weight parameters are sensitive to the 
scale of measurement used for each attribute. However, the parameters are useful for 
indicating the approximate equivalence of dollars, months and percent chance for the specific 
set of gambles used in the experiment. 
 As a final point, we note that we focused our attention on models that did not allow 
parameters to vary freely across the manipulation conditions. We made this choice because 
we wanted to test the models’ ability to predict behavior in such conditions without arbitrary 
changes in parameter values. However, researchers may wish to expand the models tested 
here to account for these manipulations. One way of extending such models would be to 
allow the parameters to vary as a function of the properties we manipulated. To that end, we 
provide posterior estimates for each model for each of the three manipulation conditions in 
the supplemental materials. However, care should be taken when attempting to understand 
these parameter values, as the attribute ranges in these datasets are quite often extreme as 
they were not designed for use in estimating the parameters of the various functions. For 
instance, the certainty dataset contains no choices where the probability was greater than 0.2, 
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therefore the parameter estimates for probability-weighting functions are not penalized if they 
poorly capture behavior for moderate to high-probabilities. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of this paper was to better understand how people make risky inter-temporal 
choices. In particular we sought to understand; 1) whether choices are made by focusing on 
comparing attribute values, or comparing utilities, and 2) how risk and delay information is 
combined. To do this we compared and evaluated the performance of several models of risky 
inter-temporal choice by examining the effects of magnitude, immediacy and certainty 
manipulations on a range of risky inter-temporal choices. This comparison included three 
existing utility-comparison models of risky inter-temporal choice from the literature. All 
three of these models, the Probability and Time Trade-off model (Baucells & Heukamp, 
2010) the Multiplicative Hyperboloid Discounting model (Vanderveldt, Green & Myerson, 
2015) and the Hyperbolic Discounting model (Yi et al., 2006) have been argued to provide 
adequate fits to risky inter-temporal data. However, this paper documents the first attempt to 
compare their relative performance, directly test the differing assumptions the models make, 
and the effects that they predict. 
In line with the literature, we found that all three of these models, as well as an 
untested model from the literature and three additional models we propose, appear to capture 
behaviour when fit directly to risky inter-temporal choice data. Crucially, however, we found 
that when predicting behaviour from these models there are clear differences in how well 
they perform. Across all three manipulations -- magnitude, immediacy and certainty -- we 
found that an attribute-comparison model we proposed, RITCH, which is a modified version 
of the existing ITCH (Ericson et al., 2015) model of inter-temporal choice, predicted 
participants’ behaviour better than any other model. The next best performing models tended 
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to be those that made qualitatively similar predictions to the RITCH model in many cases, 
such as the MHD model, which was the second best performing overall, or PD model. 
Models which assumed that risk and delay information is combined into a single attribute 
dimension, the PTT and HD models, performed very poorly. 
 
Attribute vs. Utility models 
Our results add to the growing discussion about whether utility-comparison models 
are the appropriate way to model choice behaviour (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Ericson et al., 
2015; Scholten & Read, 2010; Stewart, Chater, Stott & Reimers, 2003; Vlaev, Chater & 
Stewart, 2007; Vlaev et al., 2011). Attribute-comparison models, where participants are 
assumed to directly compare attributes across options and the worth of an option is dependent 
upon the other options presented alongside it, are often argued to provide a better reflection 
of the processes underlying choice (e.g., Konstantinidis, et al., 2019). Overall, our results 
suggest that such an attribute comparison process may better capture participants’ behaviour 
when making risky inter-temporal choices. The RITCH model, an attribute-comparison 
model, outperformed all of the utility models, even those that made qualitatively-similar 
predictions about the magnitude, immediacy and certainty manipulations. It also 
outperformed the Trade-off model, which included a mixture of attribute and utility 
processes. Furthermore, the other attribute comparison model we considered, PD, 
outperformed all utility models in the magnitude manipulation, despite predicting no effects 
of magnitude, which suggests that even when utility models predict the correct changes in 
behaviour they may not accurately reflect the processes underlying participants’ decisions. 
 
Magnitude effect. Though the RITCH model performed best in the magnitude manipulation, 
the actual pattern of results we observed is problematic for a pure attribute-comparison 
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model. As we outlined in the introduction, pure attribute-comparison models assume that 
manipulating the amount dimension only affects the evaluation of that dimension, and thus 
fail to explain changes in behaviour that imply that other dimensions were affected. For 
instance, RITCH predicts that the magnitude manipulation will increase participants’ 
preference for the larger option. However, the actual pattern we observe is more consistent 
with a change in how willing participants were to wait, than an increased attraction to the 
larger outcome. If we focus on the 3 choice types where the later option and larger option are 
not the same option, we find preferences shift towards: 1) the later option over the larger 
option when the two are in competition (the Risk vs. Amount & Delay choices); 2) the later 
option when there is no larger option (the Delay vs. Risk choices; see also Baucells & 
Heukamp, 2010; Christensen et al., 1998; Luckman et al., 2017), and 3) no change in 
preference when there is a larger option but no later option (the Risk vs. Amount choices). 
The only case where participants do not shift towards preferring the later option is the Delay 
& Risk vs. Amount choices, where rather than shifting towards the larger later riskier option 
(cf. Yi et al., 2006), they show no change in preference.  
Leaving aside the Delay & Risk vs. Amount choices, the shift towards preferring the 
later option we observe is more consistent with the explanation for the magnitude effect 
suggested by the PTT model, where discount rates decrease as a function of the amount 
offered. As such we might expect that the PTT model would capture the magnitude data 
better than RITCH. There are 3 plausible reasons why this might not be the case: 1) the 
benefit of assuming an attribute-comparison process may outweigh the benefit of predicting 
the correct magnitude effect, 2) the detriment of assuming that delays are translated into risks 
might outweigh the benefit of correctly predicting the magnitude effect, and 3) the PTT 
model is penalised for incorrectly predicting a peanuts effect in the Risk vs. Amount choices. 
To eliminate explanation 2 and explore possibilities 1 and 3 further we fit 2 additional 
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variants of the MHD model to our data, as MHD does not assume a translation of delays into 
risks. These variants assumed that the discount rate for delays decreases as a function of 
amount, similar to the PTT model, using the relationship proposed by Vincent (2016): 




       (27) 
where m < 0. As the original MHD model also predicts a peanuts effect, to eliminate 
explanation 3, one of the new variants also dropped the assumption that risk sensitivity 
changed as a function of amount (see Equation 5). In Table 8 we report the lnBFs for these 
two new models, as well as the lnBFs for the original MHD and RITCH models. As we can 
see in Column 2 the two new MHD models perform better than the original model for the 
magnitude manipulation. The MHD variant that does not predict a peanuts effect also 
outperforms the RITCH model. However, they still perform worse than RITCH model when 
all three effects are taken into account (Column 1). Taken together, these results suggest that 
we cannot draw the simple conclusion that attribute-comparison models provide a better 
account of our data than utility-comparison models. Rather, our results suggest that the strict 
distinction between the two types of processes may not be helpful. While the RITCH model, 
an attribute-comparison model, clearly provides the best account of our data, the magnitude 
manipulation results suggest that we may need to weaken the assumption that each attribute is 
compared separately, as outcome magnitude seems to reduce the importance of delays. 
 
Relative vs. Absolute differences. Within the literature on attribute-comparison models there 
is also discussion as to whether attributes are compared at an absolute, or direct, level (Dai & 
Busemeyer, 2014; Scholten & Read, 2010) or whether relative differences in attribute levels 
are considered (Cheng & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Gonzalez-
Vallejo, 2012). Since the RITCH model we proposed uses both absolute and relative 
differences, we must ask whether they are both necessary. A comparison of the fit for the PD 
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and RITCH models suggests that consideration of relative difference alone (PD model) is not 
sufficient, particularly when considering immediacy and certainty effects (compare rows 5 
and 6 of Table 5). Although not reported in the main analysis, we also tested a restricted 
version of the RITCH model that considered only absolute differences in attribute values. 
This restricted variant performed relatively well for the certainty manipulation (lnBF = 204), 
though worse than the full RITCH model, moderately for the immediacy manipulation (lnBF 
= -15), but very poorly in the magnitude condition (lnBF = -4626), even though it used the 
same mechanism for predicting magnitude effects as the full RITCH model. Overall, this 
pattern suggests that consideration of both absolute and relative differences are necessary for 
the RITCH model to capture behaviour, with the loss of either leading to worse performance 
for all three manipulations.  
 
Table 8: Logarithm of the Bayes factor for each of the 3 variants of MHD, and the RITCH 
model compared to the PTHD model. Higher values indicate better performance. The best-
performing model in each condition is bolded.  








1434 1144 37 245  
MHD- 
magnitude 
1511 1173 12 257 
RITCH 1646 1148 145 321  
 
Translation of Delays into Risks 
A recurring theme in the risky inter-temporal choice literature is the extent to which 
risks and time delays are treated as a single attribute dimension. This is reflected in existing 
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models of risky inter-temporal choice, PTT and HD, which assume that risks and delays can 
be transformed into a single dimension, by transforming delays into perceived risks, or 
probabilities into inferred delays until receipt (Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Yi et al., 2006). 
The primary implication of this assumption, which we test in our experiment, is that 
increasing either the riskiness of options, such as through the certainty manipulation, or delay 
of the options, through the immediacy manipulation, should produce similar effects. In our 
experiment we find no support for this assumption. Instead we found that for all choice types 
the certainty manipulation shifted participants’ preferences towards the riskier option, and the 
immediacy manipulation usually shifted preferences towards the later option. This result 
means that when the risk and delay are in competition, as they are in Panels 3, 4 and 5 of 
Figure 1, the two manipulations shift preferences in opposite directions. This result is 
consistent with risk and delay being treated as separate dimensions, with the immediacy 
effect acting only on the time dimension and the certainty effect acting only on the 
probability dimension. If risks and delays are treated as a single dimension we would instead 
expect the shift in these panels to be in the same direction (see rows 3 and 4 of Tables 3 and 
4). The only scenario in which we find the two manipulations affect preferences in the same 
direction is for the Delay & Risk vs. Amount choices, where the riskier and later options are 
the same option.   
The modelling results reinforce the conclusion from the behavioural results. For both 
the certainty and immediacy manipulations the models which assume a translation of risks 
and delays into a single dimension, PTT and HD, perform worse than those which assume 
they are treated as separate dimensions. The only models they outperform are the PD and 
Trade-off models when they, respectively, predict no and non-standard certainty effects (see 
Rows 5 and 7 of Table 4). If we focus just on models which assume utility comparisons 
(PTT, HD, PTHD, MHD), we also see that, as a class, models which treat risks and delays as 
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separate dimensions outperform those that assume they are a single dimension (Row 9 of 
Table 5). To further reinforce the poor performance of the translation assumption, the 
translation models also perform poorly for the magnitude effect (Column 2 Table 5) and 
overall only 3 participants show behaviour which is best explained by 1 of the two translation 
models (Column 1 of Table 6). 
Altogether these results suggest that there is not a special relationship between risks 
and delays to the extent that they can be combined into a single dimension. Instead, it appears 
that people treat them as two separate attributes with independent effects, just as they do risks 
and amounts or delays and amounts. This is problematic for any account of inter-temporal 
choice that seeks to explain discounting as due to primarily considerations of the risks 
inherent in waiting (Sozou, 1998), or an account of risky choice that explains behaviour by 
considering only the average time it would take to achieve an outcome through repeated plays 
of a gamble (Rachlin et al., 1991; Yi et al., 2006).  
However, our results do not rule out considerations of delay playing some part in 
risky choice, or risk some part in inter-temporal choice. For instance it would be perfectly 
consistent with our results for someone to consider the risks associated with waiting in a 
decision involving time delays, such as considering the likelihood of the fund provider going 
bankrupt when choosing how much to invest in a retirement fund. However, we would expect 
either these risks to not be the primary consideration driving their choice, or to be treated as 
separate to risks that are external to the delay, such as if the fund provider offered investment 
options with different risk profiles. Similarly, we might expect someone making a risky 
decision, such as whether to build on a floodplain, to consider the timescale over which a 
flood is expected to occur. This would also be consistent with our results as long as it is not 
the primary way in which they are assessing the risk, or is not treated the same as a 
guaranteed certain delay.  
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Conflicting Results 
Immediacy and Certainty Existing research into certainty and immediacy effects in risky 
inter-temporal choice is not entirely consistent with our results. According to the majority of 
the literature, we should have expected the immediacy manipulation to increase the 
proportion of participants choosing the riskier option in Risk vs. Amount choices (Baucells & 
Heukamp, 2010; Oshikoji, 2012; Sagristano, Trope & Liberman, 2002). Likewise, some 
literature suggests that the certainty manipulation increases the proportion choosing the later 
option in Delay vs. Amount choices (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Weber & Chapman, 2005a). 
Instead, we found that the immediacy manipulation had no effect on Risk vs. Amount choices 
and the certainty manipulation increased preferences for sooner options in the Delay vs. 
Amount choices. These results are more similar to the choice results of Weber and Chapman 
(2005a) or the results of Sun and Li (2010). Ignoring the effect of certainty in Delay vs. 
Amount choices, our results are consistent with explanations given for the immediacy effect 
in the inter-temporal choice literature, such as hyperbolic discounting, diminishing sensitivity 
to delay (Scholten & Read, 2010) or sensitivity to relative changes in delay (Ericson et al., 
2015). Our results are also consistent with explanations for the certainty effect in the risky 
choice literature, such as overweighting of small probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
When interpreting these different results it is important to remember that the choice 
context of our task is different to other risky inter-temporal choice experiments. In previous 
tasks, participants were generally asked to consider only a single choice type, Risk vs. 
Amount or Delay vs. Amount, and were not required to shift between situations where 
differences in probability were present, to those where differences in delay were present. Our 
task, on the other hand, required participants to adapt constantly to whether probability or 
delay differences were present. It could be that in a situation where one attribute is 
consistently non-discriminating between options, reducing certainty or immediacy have 
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similar effects on behaviour, while in situations where both attributes frequently discriminate, 
as they do in our task, the two have distinct influences. No existing theory of the task would 
provide an explanation of why that would be the case, however.  
 
Limitations 
By design, we sought to conduct a quantitative comparison of various models of risky 
inter-temporal choice. In order to fit these various models effectively, and discriminate 
between them, we needed each participant to complete a large number of risky inter-temporal 
choices. This many choices makes our experiment different from those in the literature that 
use small choice sets or one-off choices. Therefore, our conclusions may only generalize to 
similar experimental designs. For example, we observe certain ‘benchmark’ effects that are 
robustly observed in the literature (e.g., magnitude effects, standard immediacy and certainty 
effects), but do not observe peanut effects, which appear less reliably in the literature 
(compare Baucells & Heukamp, 2010; Markowitz, 1952; Myerson et al., 2003; Weber & 
Chapman, 2005b to Chapman & Weber, 2006; Vanderveldt, Green & Rachlin, 2015). If the 
discrepancy between our findings and some existing empirical results are a consequence of 
how many trials the participants complete, then our conclusions about model superiority may 
not apply to shorter trial sequences. Until we know more about the role of experimental 
design on such effects, we need to maintain care when generalizing our results to smaller 
choice-set experiments (Li, Wall, Johnson & Toubia, 2016). That said, since many 
experiments do use multiple-trial experiments, our results do speak to a large section of the 
literature. Furthermore, should the results differ when participants make fewer choices, any 





Many of the difficult choices we face – as individuals and as a society – comprise the 
explicit and combined evaluation of risks over time. Whether it be a decision to act on 
emission-reductions now in order to offset a future probabilistic benefit (some chance of 
avoiding a < 2C rise in global temperature) or simply deciding whether to take that second 
piece of cake (potentially reducing the onset of Type II diabetes) there is a pressing need to 
understand and predict how people will choose when faced with uncertainty about the timing 
and the receipt of different outcomes.  
 Our comprehensive model evaluation provides important evidence regarding the 
psychological mechanisms underlying these kinds of risky-intertemporal choices. These 
results could open the door to interventions that may improve decision-making in such 
situations. Whether via a ‘nudge’ towards a healthier, more sustainable, or more financially-
responsible option (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) or a ‘boost’ to the decision-making competency 
of an individual (Hertwig & Grune-Yannof, 2017), low-cost, subtle changes to information 
presentation can yield large effects.  For example, the clear evidence for the superiority of 
attribute-comparison models in our evaluation, suggests that presenting information about 
risks, delays and outcomes in ways that facilitates comparisons and amplifies both relative 
and absolute differences between options may make important choices simpler for people 
(e.g., Bateman et al., 2016; Reeck et al., 2017). By the same token our results suggest that 
assuming people can translate disparate attributes into a common underlying psycho-
economic scale of utility may be detrimental when designing choice environments (cf. Vlaev 






Overall, we find that magnitude, immediacy and certainty manipulations all affect 
participants’ preferences across a range of different risky inter-temporal choice types. Models 
that assumed that the immediacy and certainty manipulations respectively affect the inter-
temporal and risky components of choice, performed better than those which assumed each 
affected both components. This result suggests that future model development should focus 
on those models that treat risks and delays separately, rather than treating them as a single 
attribute dimension. Overall, we found that a model assuming an attribute-comparison 
process, RITCH, performed best, both overall and for all 3 manipulations. However, we also 
note that attribute-comparison models, such as RITCH, cannot capture completely the effect 
that outcome magnitude had on participants’ preferences. Modifying attribute-comparison 
models to predict an increased preference for the later option when outcome magnitude is 
increased would be a promising avenue for future research. Finally, we demonstrate a 
Bayesian method for testing the competing predictions of a range of existing, and new, 
models of risky inter-temporal choice. This same method is readily applicable to new models, 
or other model comparison problems, where there is limited or unbalanced information for 
determining priors for the models under comparison. 
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Table A1: Specification of functional forms of all models in the main comparison, including 
the distributional assumptions for participant level parameters (column 3), and prior 
distributions placed on hyperparameters (column 4), when models are fit to Baseline dataset. 
N(, )T(a, b) is a truncated normal distribution with mean , standard deviation , 
lowerbound a and upperbound b. U(a, b)is a uniform distribution with lowerbound a, and 
upperbound b. 
Model Function Participant Parameter Hyperparameters 
PTHD 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒−(− ln 𝑝)
𝑟
 r ~ N(r, r)T(0, 1) 
r ~ U(0, 1) 




 h ~ N(h, h)T(0, ) 
h ~ U(0, 5) 







hd ~ N(hd, hd)T(0, ) 
sd ~ N(sd, sd)T(0, ) 
hd ~ U(0, 5) 
hd ~ U(0, 5) 
sd ~ U(0, 10) 
 sd ~ U(0, 10) 
𝑤(𝑝, 𝑥) =
1
(1 +  ℎ𝑟(
1
𝑝⁄  −  1))
𝑠𝑟𝑥
𝑐 
hr ~ N(hr, hr)T(0, ) 
sr ~ N(sr, sr)T(0, ) 
c ~ N(c, c)T(0, ) 
hr ~ U(0, 360) 
hr ~ U(0, 360) 
sr ~ U(0, 10) 
sr ~ U(0, 10) 
c ~ U(0, 10) 




1 +  ℎ (𝑡 +  𝑖(1 𝑝⁄  −  1))
 
h ~ N(h, h)T(0, ) 
i ~ N(i, i)T(0, ) 
h ~ U(0, 5) 
h ~ U(0, 5) 
i ~ U(0, 360) 




𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑎  a ~ N(a , a)T(0, 100) 
a ~ U(0, 10) 
a ~ U(0, 10) 
PTT 





 ~ N(, )T(10−10, ) 
 ~ N(, )T(−, 1) 
 ~ U(10−10, 0.2) 
 ~ U(0, 0.5) 
 ~ U(−1, 1) 
 ~ U(0, 2) 
𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑒
−(𝑅𝑡 |𝑥|⁄ −ln 𝑝)
𝛾
 
R ~ N(R, R)T(0, ) 
 ~ N(, )T(0, 1) 
R ~ U(0, 150) 
R ~ U(0, 150) 
 ~ U(0, 1) 
 ~ U(0, 1) 





s ~ N(s, s)T(0, ) s ~ U(0, 100) 
s ~ U(0, 100) 
Trade-off 𝑣(𝑥) =  
1
𝛽
∙ ln(1 + 𝛽𝑥)  ~ N(, )T(0, ) 
 ~ U(0, 20) 
 ~ U(0, 20) 
𝑤𝑝(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1 𝛾⁄
  ~ N(, )T(0, 1) 
 ~ U(0, 1) 
 ~ U(0, 1) 
𝑤𝑡(𝑡) =  
1
𝜏
∙ ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡)  ~ N(, )T(0, ) 
 ~ U(0, 90) 











 ~ N(, )T(0, ) 
 ~ N(, )T(0, ) 
 ~ U(0, 200) 
 ~ U(0, 200) 
 ~ U(0, 100) 
 ~ U(0, 100) 
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 ~ N(, )T(1, )  ~ U(1, 100) 






 s ~ N(s, s)T(0, ) 
s ~ U(0, 100) 
s ~ U(0, 100) 
RITCH 
𝑋 =  𝛽𝑥𝑂 ∙ 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) +




xO ~ N(xO, xO)T(0, ) 
xA ~ N(xA, xA)T(0, ) 
xR ~ N(xR, xR)T(0, ) 
xO ~ U(0, 100) 
xO ~ U(0, 100) 
xA ~ U(0, 100) 
xA ~ U(0, 100) 
xR ~ U(0, 100) 
xR ~ U(0, 100) 
𝑇 =  𝛽𝑡𝑂 ∙ 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) +




tO ~ N(tO, tO)T(0, ) 
tA ~ N(tA, tA)T(0, ) 
tR ~ N(tR, tR)T(0, ) 
tO ~ U(0, 100) 
tO ~ U(0, 100) 
tA ~ U(0, 100) 
tA ~ U(0, 100) 
tR ~ U(0, 100) 
tR ~ U(0, 100) 
𝑅 =  𝛽𝑝𝑂 ∙ 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) +




pO ~ N(pO, pO)T(0, ) 
pA ~ N(pA, pA)T(0, ) 
pR ~ N(pR, pR)T(0, ) 
pO ~ U(0, 100) 
pO ~ U(0, 100) 
pA ~ U(0, 100) 
pA ~ U(0, 100) 
pR ~ U(0, 100) 
pR ~ U(0, 100) 
PD 





xO ~ N(xO, xO)T(0, ) 
xR ~ N(xR, xR)T(0, ) 
xO ~ U(0, 100) 
xO ~ U(0, 100) 
xR ~ U(0, 100) 
xR ~ U(0, 100) 





tO ~ N(tO, tO)T(0, ) 
tR ~ N(tR, tR)T(0, ) 
tO ~ U(0, 100) 
tO ~ U(0, 100) 
tR ~ U(0, 100) 
tR ~ U(0, 100) 





pO ~ N(pO, pO)T(0, ) 
pR ~ N(pR, pR)T(0, ) 
pR ~ U(0, 100) 
pR ~ U(0, 100) 
pO ~ U(0, 100) 
pO ~ U(0, 100) 
RITCH & 
PD 
𝑃(𝑔1|𝑔1,  𝑔2) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝑋+𝑇+𝑅)
   
 1 
Table A2: Interpretation of parameter values/meaning for all parameters of all functions of all models in the comparison set (PTHD – Prospect 
Theory & Hyperbolic Discounting, MDH – Multiplicative Hyperboloid Discounting, HD- Hyperbolic Discounting, PTT – Probability-Time-
Trade-Off, RITCH – Risky Inter-temporal choice heuristic, PD- Proportional Difference). Parameters with similar meaning are grouped 
together. Allowed ranges of all parameters are specified 
Function Model Equation Range Interpretation of parameter 
Value 
PTHD 
𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑎 a ≥ 0 
a measures how sensitive participants are to changes in amount, as a 
function of amount. If 0 < a < 1 then the value function is concave, 
with participants showing diminishing sensitivity to amounts, that is 
as the amount of money increases the effect that a unit increase in 
money has is diminished, e.g. the difference between $1 and $2 is 
much greater than the difference between $101 and $102. The lower 
a is the greater the diminishing sensitivity. If a = 1, participants 
display constant sensitivity, i.e. objective amounts and subjective 
values are linearly related with a $1 increase in amount having the 
same effect on value across the range of amounts. If a > 1, the 
participant exhibits increasing sensitivity/a convex relationship, 
with subjective value changing by more when amounts are high 
compared to low. These non-linear sensitivities to amount could be 
interpreted as due to the subjective perception of amount, or due to 
considerations of utility. In Risky choice a < 1 is often interpreted as 
indicating risk aversion, while a > 1, indicates risk seeking, but this 





𝑣(𝑥) =  
1
𝛽
∙ ln(1 + 𝛽𝑥)  > 0 
 also measures sensitivity to changes in amount, however it can 
only measure changes in the degree of diminishing sensitivity, not 
capture increasing sensitivity. For  > 0, participants exhibit 
diminishing sensitivity, with higher values of  indicating greater 
diminishing sensitivity. As  goes to 0 constant sensitivity is 
observed (linear relationship), while as  goes to infinity 
insensitivity is observed. 
 2 





 ≤ 1 
 and  both control sensitivity to amount, similar to 𝑎 in the value 
function above. When  approaches 0 (i.e. the exponential 
component reduces to a linear function) then 1 -  has equivalent 
interpretation to a in the power function above. 0 <  < 1 produces 
diminishing sensitivity to amount, with diminishing sensitivity 
increasing as  increases.  < 0 produces increasing sensitivity,  = 
0 produces linear sensitivity and  = 1 produces insensitivity to 
amounts. If  is not approaching 0, then when  < 0  participants 
show increasing sensitivity for small amounts which shifts to 
diminishing sensitivity as amounts increase. 
 > 0 
 effects the degree of diminishing sensitivity, and also the 
elasticity of the function (which is important for explaining the 
magnitude effect). When  = 0 (i.e. the power component is a linear 
function),  alone controls the concavity of the function, with 
stronger diminishing sensitivity the higher  is. When  approaches 
infinity, participants become insensitive to amounts. When  
approaches 0 the value function shifts from being decreasingly 
elastic to constant elasticity (i.e. it reduces to the power function), 
and will become linear if  = 0. 
Probability 
Weighting 
PTHD 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒−(− ln 𝑝)
𝑟
 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 
/r measures /r sub-proportionality or the extent to which 
participants overweight small probability events and underweight 
moderate to large probability events. Small /r values mean 
participants greatly overweight small probabilities and underweight 
moderate to large probabilities, while values close to 1 indicate little 
under/overweighting. /r =1 means no over/underweighting occurs, 
and decision-weights are identical to objective probabilities. Values 





(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1 𝛾⁄
 0 <  ≤ 1 





0 ≤  ≤ 1 
R ≥ 0 
Discount rate parameter. High values indicate that delayed rewards 
lose a large amount of their worth per month they are delayed, while 
low values indicate they lose little of their value. If  = 1then R/|x| is 
 3 
an exponential discount rate/compound interest rate, with the rate of 





(1 +  ℎ𝑟(
1
𝑝⁄  −  1))
𝑠𝑟𝑥
𝑐  
hr ≥ 0 
Can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it can be related to under 
and overweighting of probabilities. When srx
c = 1, low values of hr 
indicate participants overweight all probabilities, with this 
overweighting reducing and shifting to underweighting as hr 
increases. When srx
c < 1, then the probability weighting function is 
s-shaped, with hr still corresponding to increasing/decreasing 
overweighting, but also controlling the inflection point, i.e. the 
probability where participants go from underweighting to 
overweighting probabilities. As hr increases the inflection point 
decreases (i.e. more moderate probabilities are underweighted). 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a measure of discounting 
based on the inferred delay until receipt (see h below). 
sr ≥ 0 
Measures sensitivity to risk, similar to a for amounts in the value 
function above. 0 < sr < 1 (the expected range) indicates 
diminishing sensitivity to risk/odds against receipt, with participants 
more sensitive to changes in risk when risk is low (i.e. probability is 
high) compared to when risk is high (i.e. probability low). sr > 
1indicates increasing sensitivity to risk, with participants more 
sensitive to changes in odds against receipt when risk is high, than 
when risk is low. sr = 0 indicates insensitivity and sr = 1 constant 
sensitivity to odds against receipt. 
c ≥ 0 
The extent to which sensitivity to risk changes as function of 
amount. c = 0 means amount has no effect on sensitivity to risk (srx
c 
= sr). c > 0 means that sensitivity to risk increases as the amount 
offered increases, with participants more sensitive to risk for large 







1 +  ℎ (𝑡 +  𝑖(1 𝑝⁄  −  1))
 
i ≥ 0 
Scale parameter for converting odds against receipt of a reward into 
expected delay until that reward. Can be interpreted as the number 
of months participants expect they would need to wait between each 
opportunity to play the gamble. 
h ≥ 0 
h measures the discount rate. As h increases participants discount 
rewards more steeply as a function of time, i.e. if h is small then a 
reward retains more of its value per month it is delayed than if ℎ is 
large. If h = 0 then outcomes are not discounted, i.e. $x now is the 
same as $x in the future. h can also be interpreted as the simple (as 
opposed to compound) interest rate participants apply when 







(1 +  ℎ𝑑𝑡)
𝑠𝑑
 
hd ≥ 0 
sd ≥ 0 
Measures sensitivity to delay, similar to sr for risk above. 0 < sd < 1 
(expected range) indicates diminishing sensitivity to time/delay, 
with participants more sensitive to changes in delay when delays are 
small, compared to when delays are long. sd > 1 indicates increasing 
sensitivity to delay, with participants more sensitive to changes in 
delay when delays are long, than when delays are short. sd = 0 





𝑤𝑡(𝑡) =  
1
𝜏
∙ ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡)  > 0  measures diminishing sensitivity to delays. Interpretation is the 
















 ≥ 0 
Represents time sensitivity (relative to amount/utility). As  
increases participants become more sensitive to delays/less sensitive 
to utilities. 
 > 0 
Measures subadditivity. Additivity is a feature of many discounting 
models, whereby it is assumed that discounting over a time period 
(e.g. 1 month) should be equivalent regardless of whether it is 
assessed as a single interval, or broken into subintervals when 
assessing discounting (e.g. assess discounting for each of the 4 
weeks of the month). Subadditivity is a violation of additivity 
whereby discounting is greater when assessed over the subintervals 
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(e.g. 4 separate weeks) than when assessed over the whole interval 
(1 month). In the limit as  approaches 0 subadditivity disappears. 
 ≥ 1 
Measures superadditivity. The reverse of subadditivity, whereby 
discounting is greater when assessed over the single interval, 
relative to the subintervals. The model predicts a shift from 
superadditivity to subadditivity as the interval length increases. If   








s ≥ 0 
Choice scaling parameter or sensitivity parameter, it is inverse to the 
noise in the participants decisions. Determines how deterministic a 
participant’s preferences are based on the utility differences they 
observe. High values indicate very strong preferences, with 
preferences becoming binary/deterministic as s approaches infinity 
and preferences becoming weak/insensitive to utility differences as 














𝑋 = 𝛽𝑥𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑥1 − 𝑥2) +




xA ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a $1 difference in amount 
between the 2 options. The higher this value the more influence a 
difference in amount will have on the participants preference/ the 
more importance that participant gives to the absolute outcomes. 
Can be compared to tA and pA to see how much importance is 
given to a $1 difference in amount relative to a 1 month difference 
in delay relative to a 1% difference in probability. However these 
comparisons should be made with an awareness of xR, tR and pR, 
as differences in amount may still have a very large impact on a 
participants’ preferences, even if xA is relatively low, if xR (i.e. the 
weight given to proportional differences in amount) is high enough. 
 6 
PD 





xR ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a proportional change in 
amount. Higher values indicate more importance is being given to 
proportional differences in amount, but is only interpretable as a 
relative measure (i.e. when compared to other weight parameters) 
not in absolute terms. 
xO ≥ 0 
Bias towards preferring the larger amount. Higher values indicate a 
greater preference for the larger amount, regardless of the size of the 
amount difference. Can be compared to tO and pO to see strength 









tA ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a 1 month difference in delay 
between the 2 options. The higher this value the more influence a 
difference in delay will have on the participants preference/the more 
importance that participant gives to absolute delays. See xA for 
information on interpretation. 
tR ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a proportional change in 
delay. Higher values indicate more importance is being given to 
proportional differences in delay, but is only interpretable as a 
relative measure (i.e. compared to other weight parameters) not in 
absolute terms. 
PD 





tO ≥ 0 
Bias towards preferring the sooner outcome. Higher values indicate 
a greater preference for the sooner outcome, regardless of the size of 




𝑅 =  𝛽𝑝𝑂 ∙ sgn(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) +




pA ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a 1% difference in probability 
between the 2 options. The higher this value the more influence a 
difference in probability will have on the participants preference/the 
more importance that participant gives to absolute probabilities. See 
xA for information on interpretation. 
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PD 





pR ≥ 0 
Measures the relative weight given to a proportional change in 
probability. Higher values indicate more importance is being given 
to proportional differences in probability, but is only interpretable as 
a relative measure (i.e. compared to other weight parameters) not in 
absolute terms. 
pO ≥ 0 
Bias towards preferring the safer outcome. Higher values indicate a 
greater preference for the safer outcome, regardless of the size of 
the probability difference. Can be compared to tO and xO. 
 1 
Appendix B 
Example of Trial 
 
 
Table A3: Amounts, Delays and Probabilities used in the 96 Baseline choices and 6 
dominated choices. Number (proportion) of participants choosing Option 1 in the Baseline, 
Magnitude, Immediacy and Certainty datasets also supplied. Within each choice type 
individual choice items have been ordered so that the proportion choosing Option 1in the 
Baseline dataset increases. This matches the plot order in Figure 1.  
Type Option 1 Option 2 Base. Mag. Imm. Cert. 
Risk vs. 
Amount 
$75 in 3 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$100 in 3 mos. 









$250 in 8 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$325 in 8 mos. 









$300 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$475 in 0 mos. 









$125 in 9 mos. 
with p = 0.45 
$475 in 9 mos. 









$150 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$400 in 0 mos. 









$150 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.85 
$475 in 0 mos. 









$125 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$250 in 0 mos. 









$100 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$200 in 1 mos. 










$325 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.55 
$350 in 5 mos. 









$50 in 4 mos. 
with p = 0.25 
$325 in 4 mos. 









$100 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$425 in 0 mos. 









$50 in 6 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$375 in 6 mos. 









$275 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$400 in 0 mos. 









$50 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$275 in 0 mos. 









$325 in 2 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$400 in 2 mos. 









$200 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$400 in 0 mos. 











$100 in 1 mos. 
with p = 1 
$200 in 5 mos. 









$325 in 2 mos. 
with p = 1 
$475 in 9 mos. 









$100 in 3 mos. 
with p = 1 
$225 in 12 mos. 









$125 in 3 mos. 
with p = 1 
$325 in 21 mos. 









$175 in 4 mos. 
with p = 1 
$350 in 15 mos. 









$100 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$325 in 12 mos. 









$75 in 1 mos. 
with p = 1 
$300 in 30 mos. 









$350 in 30 mos. 
with p = 1 
$425 in 42 mos. 









$175 in 12 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$350 in 30 mos. 









$125 in 6 mos. 
with p = 1 
$325 in 30 mos. 









$300 in 13 mos. 
with p = 0.8 
$425 in 30 mos. 









$75 in 4 mos. 
with p = 0.65 
$225 in 30 mos. 









$350 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$450 in 4 mos. 









$75 in 15 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$175 in 36 mos. 









$150 in 6 mos. 
with p = 0.85 
$450 in 27 mos. 










$125 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$350 in 24 mos. 











$250 in 3 mos. 
with p = 0.45 
$250 in 6 mos. 









$350 in 4 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$350 in 8 mos. 









$150 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$150 in 9 mos. 









$225 in 2 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$225 in 6 mos. 









$150 in 6 mos. 
with p = 0.2 
$150 in 36 mos. 









$50 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.55 
$50 in 5 mos. 









$100 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$100 in 4 mos. 









$400 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.8 
$400 in 8 mos. 









$300 in 9 mos. 
with p = 0.4 
$300 in 15 mos. 









$400 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$400 in 15 mos. 









$75 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.1 
$75 in 42 mos. 









$450 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$450 in 21 mos. 









$225 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.85 
$225 in 12 mos. 









$250 in 9 mos. 
with p = 0.35 
$250 in 18 mos. 









$50 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.85 
$50 in 9 mos. 









$125 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$125 in 5 mos. 












$225 in 4 mos. 
with p = 1 
$450 in 0 mos. 









$125 in 12 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$150 in 2 mos. 









$150 in 24 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$325 in 21 mos. 









$50 in 3 mos. 
with p = 1 
$325 in 0 mos. 









$150 in 9 mos. 
with p = 1 
$325 in 0 mos. 









$50 in 6 mos. 
with p = 1 
$225 in 0 mos. 










$375 in 4 mos. 
with p = 1 
$475 in 0 mos. 









$175 in 1 mos. 
with p = 1 
$400 in 0 mos. 









$175 in 8 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$400 in 3 mos. 









$175 in 2 mos. 
with p = 1 
$450 in 0 mos. 









$175 in 54 mos. 
with p = 0.55 
$450 in 24 mos. 









$250 in 13 mos. 
with p = 0.35 
$325 in 12 mos. 









$200 in 9 mos. 
with p = 1 
$450 in 0 mos. 









$100 in 12 mos. 
with p = 0.45 
$400 in 5 mos. 









$100 in 21 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$125 in 2 mos. 









$375 in 42 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$450 in 36 mos. 












$125 in 13 mos. 
with p = 0.7 
$150 in 15 mos. 









$325 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.5 
$425 in 2 mos. 









$425 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.2 
$450 in 24 mos. 









$50 in 30 mos. 
with p = 0.4 
$275 in 54 mos. 









$300 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$450 in 2 mos. 









$100 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.35 
$475 in 30 mos. 









$425 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.2 
$450 in 15 mos. 









$75 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$150 in 4 mos. 









$175 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$250 in 21 mos. 









$375 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.75 
$475 in 15 mos. 









$225 in 12 mos. 
with p = 0.2 
$250 in 30 mos. 









$275 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.85 
$325 in 12 mos. 









$225 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$450 in 15 mos. 










$425 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.8 
$450 in 13 mos. 









$150 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.4 
$350 in 36 mos. 









$75 in 0 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$125 in 24 mos. 












$175 in 3 mos. 
with p = 0.9 
$300 in 4 mos. 









$275 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$475 in 4 mos. 









$125 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$375 in 21 mos. 









$175 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$300 in 5 mos. 









$175 in 8 mos. 
with p = 0.55 
$350 in 18 mos. 









$175 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$375 in 2 mos. 









$125 in 9 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$350 in 54 mos. 









$250 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$375 in 5 mos. 









$150 in 1 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$475 in 4 mos. 









$75 in 18 mos. 
with p = 0.95 
$450 in 21 mos. 









$50 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$225 in 21 mos. 









$50 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$75 in 3 mos. 









$175 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.55 
$225 in 8 mos. 









$100 in 0 mos. 
with p = 1 
$450 in 15 mos. 









$325 in 5 mos. 
with p = 0.45 
$375 in 8 mos. 









$200 in 3 mos. 
with p = 0.6 
$300 in 24 mos. 











$50 in 0 mos. 
with p =.4 
$50 in 0 mos. 
with p = .3 
87 
(0.97) 
   
 
$50 in 18 mos., 
with p =1 
$50 in 24 mos., 
with p = 1 
85 
(0.94) 
   
 
$400 in 6 mos. 
with p = .7 
$400 in 9 mos. 
with p = .6 
90  
(1) 
   
 
$300 in 3 mos. 
with p = .8 
$275 in 6 mos. 
with p = .8 
87 
(0.97) 
   
 6 
 
$300 in 9 mos. 
with p = .85 
$275 in 9 mos. 
with p = .7 
86 
(0.96) 
   
 
$225 in 18 mos. 
with p = .4 
$175 in 18 mos. 
with p = .4 
83 
(0.92) 
   
 
